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  ADVISOR:	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  G.	  Lewis	  Wind	  Power	  in	  China:	  Has	  China	  Greenwashed	  the	  Global	  Energy	  Sector?	  	  Department	  of	  Economics,	  June	  2016.	  	  Due	  to	  years	  of	  serving	  as	  the	  world’s	  manufacturing	  hub,	  and	  appropriately	  developing	  a	  global	  reputation	  of	  being	  environmentally-­‐unfriendly,	  China	  has	  since	  sought	  to	  rejuvenate	  its	  image	  by	  becoming	  an	  international	  leader	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  wind	  power.	  However,	  if	  one	  were	  to	  pull	  back	  the	  curtain	  on	  China’s	  wind	  energy	  program,	  they	  would	  find	  that	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  may	  be	  intentionally	  putting	  on	  a	  facade.	  By	  reporting	  the	  number	  of	  wind	  turbines	  constructed	  nationally,	  but	  not	  the	  number	  of	  turbines	  actually	  generating	  electricity,	  China	  has	  hoodwinked	  the	  worldwide	  energy	  sector	  and	  general	  public.	  The	  idle	  wind	  turbines	  cost	  China	  not	  only	  valuable	  energy,	  but	  also	  roughly	  $2	  Billion	  annually	  in	  forgone	  revenue.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  wind	  success,	  China	  must	  deal	  first	  with	  its	  most	  significant	  bottleneck:	  an	  outdated	  and	  inefficient	  energy	  grid	  infrastructure.	  By	  choosing	  to	  build	  wind	  turbines	  before	  constructing	  a	  Smart	  Grid	  to	  support	  their	  energy	  transmission,	  China	  has	  shot	  itself	  in	  the	  foot	  environmentally,	  geopolitically,	  and	  economically.	  This	  thesis	  exposes	  an	  important	  defect	  in	  China’s	  energy	  system	  and	  will	  be	  of	  use	  to	  all	  with	  interests	  in	  business	  ethics,	  the	  environment,	  engineering,	  and	  economists	  alike.	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Chapter	  1	  -­‐	  Introduction:	  	  The	  last	  15	  years	  have	  ushered	  in	  colossal	  growth	  in	  China's	  wind	  power	  sector.	  Entering	  the	  wind	  energy	  picture	  only	  around	  2000,	  China	  in	  just	  one	  decade	  became	  home	  to	  50%	  of	  the	  world's	  installed	  capacity	  of	  wind	  turbine	  generators	  (WTG).	  In	  addition,	  by	  2009	  China	  had	  trumped	  Denmark,	  Germany,	  Spain,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  to	  become	  the	  world's	  leading	  manufacturer	  of	  WTGs.1	  Wind	  power	  has	  had	  major	  investment	  at	  the	  highest	  level,	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party,	  for	  many	  reasons	  including	  its	  minimal	  environmental	  impact	  and	  low	  cost.	  Currently	  the	  chief	  non-­‐hydro	  renewable	  source	  across	  China,	  wind	  energy	  is	  expected	  to	  maintain	  its	  influence	  and	  potentially	  help	  mold	  China	  into	  an	  "ecological	  civilization,"	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  industrial	  revolution	  of	  the	  western	  world.2	  All	  in	  all,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  China	  is	  utilizing	  wind	  power	  as	  a	  political	  and	  conservational	  transition	  from	  a	  fossil	  fuel	  based	  energy	  sector	  into	  a	  decarbonized	  renewable	  based	  energy	  system.	  	  	  In	  light	  of	  China's	  recent	  and	  swift	  ascent	  to	  becoming	  a	  world	  leader	  in	  wind	  power,	  I	  conduct	  this	  thesis	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  not	  only	  adding	  sagacity	  to	  this	  international	  discussion,	  but	  also	  so	  as	  to	  invoke	  several	  concerns	  and	  unforeseen	  challenges	  to	  China’s	  role	  in	  the	  wind	  sector.	  Because	  China	  emits	  roughly	  one	  quarter	  of	  Earth’s	  greenhouse	  
                                                1	  Keith	  Bradsher,	  “China	  is	  leading	  the	  race	  to	  make	  clean	  energy,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  January	  30,	  2010,	  accessed	  February	  1,	  2016,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/business/energy-­‐environment/31renew.html?_r=0	  2	  中国网,	  “第八部分,”	  大力推进生态文明建设,	  时间,	  	  November	  11,	  2011	  [personally	  translated],	  accessed	  January	  14,	  2016,	  http://v.china.com.cn/18da/2012-­‐11/11/content_27074139.htm	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gases,	  environmentalists	  largely	  debate	  whether	  they	  will	  permanently	  damage	  Earth’s	  environment	  or	  lead	  an	  ecological	  revolution.	  	  Before	  looking	  into	  China’s	  energy	  related	  issues,	  I	  will	  begin	  by	  explaining	  China’s	  political	  atmosphere	  and	  energy	  history	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  This	  chapter	  will	  highlight	  how	  the	  central	  role	  of	  China’s	  government	  is	  advantageous	  to	  the	  nation’s	  abilities	  to	  pass	  renewable	  legislation.	  Next,	  in	  order	  to	  depict	  China’s	  progress-­‐to-­‐date	  and	  future	  outlook	  of	  wind	  power	  generation,	  I’ll	  provide	  in	  Chapter	  3	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  approaches	  which	  have	  been	  instrumental	  in	  the	  immense	  increase	  of	  Chinese	  onshore	  wind	  turbine	  construction.	  Using	  specific	  policy	  procedures	  which	  are	  claimed	  to	  have	  empowered	  China’s	  development,	  I	  will	  examine	  their	  system	  design	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  revealing	  how	  China	  fundamentally	  constructed	  its	  wind	  program.	  	  Specifically,	  I’ll	  touch	  upon	  the	  feed-­‐in-­‐tariff	  (FIT)	  for	  wind,	  created	  in	  2009,	  which	  has	  been	  crucial	  to	  providing	  financial	  incentives	  for	  China’s	  wind	  sector	  growth.	  Next,	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  I	  will	  discuss	  how	  China’s	  weak	  regulation,	  outdated	  grid,	  and	  feeble	  transmission	  lines	  have	  curtailed	  wind	  power	  growth	  potential.	  Also	  in	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  provide	  evidence	  that	  China	  has	  shown	  a	  tendency	  to	  build	  its	  energy	  system	  backwards,	  perhaps	  in	  order	  to	  inflate	  its	  international	  environmental	  reputation.	  Chapter	  5	  introduces	  the	  potentially	  instrumental	  role	  that	  the	  Smart	  Grid	  would	  have	  in	  the	  success	  of	  China’s	  transition	  to	  a	  renewable	  energy	  system.	  However,	  that	  analysis	  also	  highlights	  a	  deeper	  systemic	  bottleneck,	  which	  China	  may	  be	  setting	  up	  for	  themselves	  by	  developing	  transmission	  lines	  before	  a	  regional	  grid	  which	  can	  support	  such	  lines.	  	  
 3 
The	  final	  section,	  Chapter	  6,	  covers	  the	  economic,	  social,	  and	  environmental	  costs	  of	  wind	  power	  and	  the	  Smart	  Grid	  system.	  This	  section	  suggests	  that	  China’s	  barriers	  to	  wind	  success	  may	  have	  delayed	  the	  completion	  of	  their	  energy	  transition	  by	  several	  years,	  as	  well	  as	  accounted	  for	  significant	  extra	  costs.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  subjective	  fact-­‐based	  study	  and	  forecast	  for	  academics	  and	  politicians	  worldwide	  to	  use	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  past	  and	  future	  of	  China’s	  rapidly	  progressing	  energy	  sector.	  For	  clarification	  purposes,	  I	  must	  state	  that	  this	  thesis	  will	  only	  dissertate	  onshore	  wind	  power,	  because	  offshore	  wind	  power	  currently	  represents	  only	  0.002%	  of	  China’s	  total	  wind	  power	  production.3	  	  With	  the	  intention	  of	  clarifying	  the	  opportuneness	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  begin	  by	  first	  providing	  background	  on	  the	  state	  of	  China’s	  current	  electricity	  system,	  with	  special	  attention	  on	  its	  anthropogenic	  effects.	  From	  1950-­‐2012,	  China’s	  cumulative	  emissions	  from	  burning	  fossil	  and	  cement	  production	  totaled	  130	  Gigatons	  (GT)	  of	  CO2.4	  To	  put	  that	  in	  perspective,	  with	  8.50	  GT	  of	  C02	  in	  2012,	  China	  was	  responsible	  for	  25%	  of	  worldwide	  carbon	  emissions	  that	  year.5	  Furthermore,	  according	  to	  predictions	  by	  the	  International	  Energy	  Agency	  (IEA),	  China’s	  electricity	  sector	  will	  be	  responsible	  for	  60%	  of	  the	  growth	  in	  China’s	  energy	  driven	  carbon	  emissions.	  Taking	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  China’s	  carbon	  footprint,	  in	  2012,	  about	  90%	  of	  China’s	  energy	  consumption	  came	  from	  fossil	  fuels	  (figure	  1):	  70%	  from	  coal	  consumption,	  12%	  from	  oil	  and	  8%	  from	  gas.	  Considering	  that	  China	  only	  amasses	  6%	  of	  Earth’s	  total	  land	  area	  yet	  it	  produces	  roughly	  25%	  of	  its	  carbon	  emissions,	  
                                                3	  Steve	  Sawyer	  and	  Klaus	  Rave,	  “Global	  Wind	  Report	  Annual	  Market	  Update	  2014,”	  Global	  Wind	  Energy	  
Council	  (GWEC),	  2014.	  4	  Zhu	  Liu,	  “China’s	  Carbon	  Emissions	  Report	  2015,”	  Sustainability	  Science	  Program	  and	  Energy	  Technology	  
Innovation	  Policy	  research	  group,	  Harvard	  Kennedy	  School	  of	  Government,	  1,	  (2015),	  accessed	  January	  12,	  2016,	  http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/carbon-­‐emissions-­‐report-­‐2015-­‐final.pdf	  5	  Liu,	  “China’s	  Carbon	  Emissions	  Report	  2015,”	  4.	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the	  subject	  matter	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  germane	  for	  all	  future	  projections	  about	  Earth’s	  anthropocene.6	  	  Lastly,	  its	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  interestingly,	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  my	  sources	  have	  been	  written	  in	  English,	  with	  most	  articles	  published	  by	  international	  agencies	  on	  global	  energy	  outlooks.	  Therefore,	  while	  I	  was	  able	  to	  survey	  some	  journal	  articles	  written	  in	  Chinese,	  most	  Chinese	  scholars	  instead	  chose	  to	  publish	  their	  works	  in	  English.	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  the	  case	  due	  to	  government	  censorship	  of	  articles,	  but	  nevertheless	  I	  have	  used	  my	  Chinese	  language	  proficiency	  to	  translate	  and	  interpret	  the	  few	  articles	  I	  have	  come	  across.	  Finally,	  this	  thesis	  will	  not	  contain	  data-­‐driven	  analysis	  due	  to	  issues	  of	  restricted	  access	  to	  a	  reliable	  data-­‐set	  on	  Chinese	  wind-­‐energy	  statistics;	  however,	  the	  statistics	  which	  I	  do	  provide	  are	  the	  most	  current	  statistics	  published	  by	  renowned	  global	  energy	  agencies	  who	  are	  granted	  access.	  	  	   	  
                                                6	  “The	  World	  Bank	  Arable	  land	  (%	  of	  land	  area),	  last	  modified	  February	  28,	  2016,	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.ARBL.ZS	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Chapter	  2	  -­‐	  Political	  Framework	  and	  Energy	  History	  
	   Before	  looking	  into	  the	  Chinese	  government’s	  wind	  power	  policies,	  I	  will	  first	  explain	  how	  the	  Chinese	  socialist	  market	  economy	  functions	  and	  subsequently	  how	  it	  seeks	  to	  increase	  wind	  power	  development.	  From	  1949	  to	  1976,	  Chairman	  Mao	  Zedong	  oversaw	  the	  Chinese	  government	  as	  a	  totalitarian	  regime,	  wherein	  government	  officials	  were	  appointed	  instead	  of	  elected.	  However,	  following	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  and	  Mao’s	  death,	  power	  transferred	  to	  Chinese	  leader	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  who	  sought	  to	  revitalize	  the	  economy	  by	  adding	  free-­‐market	  aspects	  to	  the	  centrally	  controlled	  economy.	  Originally,	  Deng’s	  plan	  was	  based	  on	  “usage	  value,”	  which	  differed	  from	  capitalism	  in	  that	  goods	  and	  services	  were	  produced	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  society,	  not	  for	  profit	  generation	  and	  capital	  accumulation.7	  From	  the	  1980s	  onwards,	  however,	  China	  transitioned	  to	  the	  socialist	  market	  economy	  it	  now	  operates	  by	  opening	  up	  to	  international	  trade.	  While	  75%	  of	  China’s	  GDP	  in	  1978	  came	  from	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (SOE),	  as	  of	  2008	  only	  25%	  of	  China’s	  total	  GDP	  came	  from	  SOEs.8	  Nonetheless,	  SOEs	  have	  been	  on	  the	  rise	  in	  China	  since	  2008	  due	  to	  the	  CCP	  insecurity	  that	  its	  once	  dominant	  hand	  in	  the	  market	  has	  been	  weakened.	  	   In	  2012	  Xi	  Jinping	  became	  the	  President	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  replacing	  widely	  revered	  past	  President	  Hu	  Jintao.	  The	  current	  Chinese	  government,	  like	  the	  US	  government,	  has	  three	  branches:	  the	  People’s	  Congress	  (lawmakers),	  the	  executive	  branch	  
                                                7Shobhit	  Shen,	  “Socialist	  Economies:	  How	  China,	  Cuba	  And	  North	  Korea	  Work,“	  Investopedia,	  August	  15,	  2014,	  accessed	  November	  18,	  2016,	  http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/081514/socialist-­‐economies-­‐how-­‐china-­‐cuba-­‐and-­‐north-­‐korea-­‐work.asp	  8	  Peter	  R.	  Orszag,	  “Private	  Companies	  are	  Driving	  China’s	  Growth,”	  BloombergView,	  October	  14,	  2014,	  accessed	  February	  14,	  2016,	  http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-­‐10-­‐14/private-­‐companies-­‐are-­‐driving-­‐china-­‐s-­‐growth	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(administration),	  and	  the	  court.	  The	  major	  difference	  though	  is	  presence	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party.	  In	  order	  to	  work	  in	  government	  or	  law	  enforcement,	  you	  must	  be	  a	  party	  member.	  The	  Party	  essentially	  runs	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  with	  the	  Chinese	  government,	  meaning	  that	  each	  government	  position	  has	  a	  party	  position	  that	  matches	  its	  status	  and	  power.9	  This	  means	  that	  every	  provincial	  government	  will	  have	  its	  own	  party	  secretary	  who	  will	  ensure	  that	  each	  action	  falls	  in	  line	  with	  Party	  rules	  and	  regulations.	  Hence,	  the	  Party	  secretary	  truly	  holds	  the	  power.	  Party	  dominance	  becomes	  important	  when	  wind	  and	  grid	  development	  are	  considered	  in	  their	  regional	  respects.	  	   Another	  imperative	  aspect	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  is	  its	  management	  of	  about	  160,000	  SOEs.	  China’s	  SOEs	  are	  legal	  entities	  created	  by	  the	  CCP	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  operate	  in	  nationwide	  commercial	  activities	  on	  the	  government's	  behalf.10	  A	  relatable	  example	  is	  the	  U.S.	  owned	  mortgage	  company	  duo	  Freddie	  Mac	  and	  Fannie	  Mae,	  which	  are	  technically	  considered	  to	  be	  government-­‐sponsored	  enterprises	  (GSE).	  Unlike	  the	  U.S.	  though,	  China’s	  SOEs	  have	  dominated	  its	  market	  economy	  for	  years,	  often	  disrupting	  the	  market’s	  invisible	  hand	  by	  state	  controlled	  price	  variations	  and	  decisions.	  	  While	  you	  would	  think	  that	  such	  enterprises	  should	  have	  slowed	  down	  by	  now,	  Yukon	  Huang,	  former	  China	  director	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  points	  out	  “President	  Xi	  Jinping	  believes	  that	  a	  large	  state-­‐enterprise	  sector	  is	  good.”11	  President	  Xi	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  ‘zombie	  enterprises’	  of	  our	  Western	  world	  who	  have	  become	  ‘too	  big	  to	  fail,’	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  
                                                9	  Megan	  Alnada,	  “How	  China	  is	  Ruled,”	  BBC	  News,	  December	  18,	  2015,	  accessed	  January	  4,	  2016,	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/government/html/1.stm	  10	  “State-­‐Owned	  Enterprise	  –	  SOE,”	  Investopedia,	  January	  7,	  2016,	  http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/soe.asp	  11	  Gabriel	  Wildau,“China’s	  state	  owned	  zombie	  economy,”	  Financial	  Times,	  February	  29,	  2016.	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bailouts	  during	  the	  2009	  recession.	  As	  a	  result,	  President	  Xi	  has	  continued	  to	  promote	  both	  an	  economy	  as	  well	  as	  an	  energy	  sector	  that	  is	  partly	  controlled	  by	  the	  CCP’s	  rule.	  As	  displayed	  in	  figure	  2,	  with	  data	  provided	  by	  the	  Chinese	  finance	  ministry	  and	  Financial	  Times,	  although	  China	  successfully	  downsized	  SOEs	  from	  about	  240,000	  local	  enterprises	  to	  less	  than	  100,000	  in	  2009,	  one	  can	  notice	  that	  the	  trend	  became	  positive	  after	  2009,	  indicating	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  volume	  of	  SOEs.12	  In	  addition,	  the	  number	  of	  centrally	  owned	  enterprises	  increases	  throughout	  the	  years	  2000	  and	  2013,	  showing	  the	  government’s	  increasingly	  controlling	  hand	  on	  the	  industrial	  sector	  and	  economy.	  	   China’s	  two	  largest	  SOEs	  are	  the	  State	  Grid	  Corporation	  of	  China	  (SGCC)	  and	  the	  China	  Southern	  Power	  Grid	  Company	  (CSGC).	  The	  SGCC	  supplies	  power	  to	  about	  88%	  of	  China’s	  regional	  grid	  while	  the	  CSGC	  accounts	  for	  the	  remaining	  12%.	  The	  SGCC	  is	  not	  only	  listed	  as	  seventh	  on	  the	  Fortune	  Global	  500	  list,	  with	  assets	  exceeding	  $430	  billion	  USD,	  but	  	  also	  partially	  owns	  and	  operates	  electricity	  grids	  in	  Portugal	  and	  Brazil.13	  The	  government	  	  	  
                                                12	  Wildau,	  “China’s	  State	  owned	  zombie	  economy,”	  2.	  13	  “Fortune	  Global	  500	  List,”	  Fortune,	  December	  31,	  2015,	  http://fortune.com/global500/	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ownership	  of	  these	  colossal	  enterprises	  is	  central	  to	  China’s	  ability	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  at	  the	  highest	  level,	  and	  see	  it	  come	  to	  fruition	  in	  a	  matter	  of	  days.	  In	  the	  U.S.,	  a	  decision	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  may	  take	  months	  or	  years	  to	  take	  effect	  after	  passing	  legislation.	  Therefore,	  when	  the	  SGCC	  proposed	  in	  2011	  that	  is	  would	  spend	  $400	  billion	  on	  power	  grid	  construction	  and	  $100	  billion	  on	  Smart	  Grid	  investment	  over	  the	  next	  five	  years,	  planning	  and	  construction	  began	  promptly	  after.14	  The	  CSGC,	  which	  controls	  the	  three	  provinces	  with	  the	  richest	  hydro	  resources	  in	  China,	  has	  pledged	  $15	  billion	  to	  Smart	  Grid	  investment.15	  However,	  while	  political	  structure	  should	  certainly	  play	  to	  China’s	  advantage,	  this	  paper	  finds	  that	  external	  factors,	  such	  as	  a	  global	  reputation	  as	  a	  polluter,	  have	  driven	  China	  to	  build	  their	  energy	  system	  inefficiently.	  This	  prediction	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  The	  Chinese	  government	  has	  four	  state-­‐run	  agencies	  that	  oversee	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Smart	  Grid	  and	  the	  wind	  power	  program.	  The	  National	  Development	  and	  Reform	  Commission	  (NDRC)	  oversees	  all	  aspects	  of	  economy	  development	  including,	  for	  the	  smart	  grid,	  controlled	  electricity	  pricing,	  benchmarks	  for	  FIT	  and	  sales	  tariff,	  and	  authorization	  of	  review	  and	  approval	  of	  Smart	  Grid	  and	  wind	  construction	  projects.16	  The	  National	  Energy	  Agency	  (NEA)	  acts	  as	  a	  vice-­‐ministerial	  department	  to	  the	  ministerial	  agency	  NDRC.	  The	  agency	  produces	  and	  publicizes	  China’s	  domestic	  energy	  policy	  and	  development	  targets,	  which	  includes	  renewable	  energy	  outlooks	  as	  well	  as	  Smart	  Grid	  
                                                14	  “Smart	  Grid	  Technologies	  Continue	  to	  Spread,”	  Worldwatch	  Institute,	  February	  27,	  2013,	  accessed	  February	  2,	  2016,	  http://www.worldwatch.org/smart-­‐grid-­‐technologies-­‐continue-­‐spread	  15	  “Smart	  Grid	  in	  China	  –	  a	  R&D	  Perspective,”	  Innovation	  Centre	  Shanghai,	  July	  1,	  2013,,	  accessed	  January	  17,	  2016,	  http://assets.fiercemarkets.net/public/sites/energy/reports/chinasgreport.pdf	  16	  Dexter	  Roberts,	  “China’s	  Economic	  Policy	  Factory:	  The	  NDRC,”	  Bloomberg	  Business,	  June	  20,	  2013,	  accessed	  February	  18,	  2016,	  http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-­‐06-­‐20/chinas-­‐economic-­‐policy-­‐factory-­‐the-­‐ndrc	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construction	  planning.	  The	  State	  Electricity	  Regulatory	  Commission	  (SERC)	  manages	  the	  daily	  operation	  of	  China’s	  power	  generation	  corporations	  as	  well	  as	  utility	  companies.	  Finally,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology	  (MOST),	  since	  assigned	  in	  the	  12th	  Five-­‐Year	  plan,	  has	  played	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  technology	  for	  both	  wind	  turbines	  and	  Smart	  Grid.	  On	  a	  grander	  level,	  what	  drove	  the	  need	  for	  these	  agencies	  to	  be	  created?	  While	  the	  transition	  to	  an	  open	  market	  economy	  has	  led	  China	  to	  become	  the	  world’s	  largest	  manufacturing	  economy	  in	  just	  30	  years,	  it	  has	  also	  transformed	  China	  into	  a	  virtual	  emissions	  economy,	  wherein	  about	  25%	  of	  China’s	  carbon	  emissions	  are	  produced	  by	  domestically	  manufactured	  products	  that	  are	  consumed	  overseas.	  Using	  a	  rule	  of	  thumb	  test,	  25%	  multiplied	  by	  25%	  gives	  6.25%;	  this	  is	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  world’s	  emissions	  attributable	  to	  Chinese	  manufacturing.	  We	  can	  compare	  this	  to	  Germany’s	  carbon	  emissions,	  wherein	  domestic	  manufacturing	  plants	  account	  for	  3%	  of	  its	  national	  emissions.	  Using	  the	  same	  rule	  of	  thumb	  test,	  we	  find	  that	  0.09%	  of	  the	  world’s	  emissions	  are	  attributable	  to	  Germany’s	  manufacturing.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  China’s	  explosive	  growth	  has	  come	  with	  many	  consequences,	  chiefly	  public	  concern	  over	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  Chinese	  government’s	  motivation	  behind	  using	  financial	  and	  political	  capital	  to	  fund	  the	  renewable	  sector,	  especially	  wind,	  should	  become	  clearer.	  To	  comprehend	  the	  issue	  in	  further	  depth,	  one	  must	  observe	  to	  what	  degree	  coal,	  the	  fundamental	  cheap	  and	  abundant	  energy	  resource,	  has	  fueled	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  and	  destroyed	  the	  Chinese	  environmental	  image.	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Once	  powering	  almost	  80%	  of	  China’s	  energy	  sector,	  coal	  resources	  in	  China	  are	  quickly	  abating.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2007,	  China’s	  ratio	  of	  coal	  reserves	  to	  production	  per	  year	  was	  45	  to	  1	  while	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2014	  the	  ratio	  diminished	  to	  30	  to	  1.17	  This	  means	  that	  in	  7	  years,	  China	  utilized	  15	  years	  of	  coal	  reserves	  suggesting	  that	  the	  current	  reserves	  of	  30	  years	  will	  likely	  run	  dry	  earlier	  than	  2046.18	  Considering	  that	  just	  this	  year	  President	  Xi	  Jinping	  announced	  a	  peak	  in	  Chinese	  carbon	  emissions	  by	  2030,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  nation	  will	  quickly	  begin	  to	  rely	  more	  heavily	  on	  wind	  and	  nuclear	  power	  generation.	  Yet,	  it	  is	  not	  out	  of	  the	  question	  that	  China	  is	  looking	  for	  other	  coal	  reserves	  to	  provide	  themselves	  with	  some	  “polluted”	  cushioning	  during	  the	  energy	  transition	  period.	  Aside	  from	  depleting	  resources,	  coal	  has	  introduced	  several	  other	  issues	  for	  China’s	  energy	  sector.	  Joanna	  Lewis,	  in	  her	  2013	  book	  Green	  Innovation	  in	  China,	  argues	  that	  the	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions,	  generated	  from	  China’s	  many	  coal	  power	  plants,	  have	  induced	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  members	  to	  shift	  environmental	  regulation	  towards	  promotion	  of	  a	  non-­‐fossil	  fuel	  based	  economy.19	  Lewis	  adds	  that	  coal	  based	  power	  plants	  emit	  toxic	  gases	  such	  as	  sulfur	  dioxide,	  nitrogen	  oxide	  and	  mercury	  which	  are	  deleterious	  to	  human	  health	  as	  well	  as	  to	  arable	  terrain.20	  	  The	  issue	  is	  so	  severe	  that	  several	  sources	  have	  estimated	  that	  acid	  rain	  costs	  China	  2.5%	  of	  its	  GDP	  annual.	  These	  costs	  are	  incurred	  when	  acid	  rain	  damages	  crops,	  causes	  
                                                17	  David	  Winning,	  “China’s	  Coal	  Crisis,”	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  November	  16,	  2010,	  accessed	  November	  28,	  2016,	  http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704312504575617810380509880	  18	  “BP	  Statistical	  Review	  of	  World	  Energy,”	  BP,	  June	  2015,	  accessed	  February	  1,	  2016,	  https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-­‐economics/statistical-­‐review-­‐2015/bp-­‐statistical-­‐review-­‐of-­‐world-­‐energy-­‐2015-­‐full-­‐report.pdf	  19	  Joanna	  Lewis,	  “Green	  Innovation	  in	  China,”	  Insert	  Publishing	  Organization,	  2013.	  20	  http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/coalvswind/c02c.html#.VlPey_mrTgk	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deforestation,	  deteriorates	  buildings,	  and	  pollutes	  water	  sources	  etc.	  Whilst	  personally	  sightseeing	  at	  China	  world	  famous	  Leshan	  Buddha,	  the	  world’s	  largest	  stone	  Buddha,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  that	  the	  symbol	  of	  peace	  and	  harmony	  has	  become	  visibly	  deteriorated	  by	  acid	  rain,	  and	  now	  become	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  Chinese	  pollution	  problem.	  In	  an	  odd	  way,	  China’s	  understanding	  of	  this	  has	  actually	  made	  them	  look	  at	  the	  overall	  costs	  of	  coal,	  not	  just	  private	  monetary	  ones.	  For	  a	  country	  which	  seeks	  economic	  prosperity,	  one	  can	  observe	  why	  Chinese	  lawmakers	  have	  now	  began	  to	  address	  coal	  power	  plants	  as	  an	  issue.	  	  Air	  pollution	  caused	  by	  industrial	  factories	  and	  coal	  power	  plants	  has	  resulted	  in	  significant	  human	  respiratory	  issues.	  While	  public	  disclosure	  of	  deaths	  related	  to	  pollution	  was	  censored	  until	  2014,	  Chen	  Zhu,	  Chinese	  government	  health	  minister,	  announced	  that	  somewhere	  between	  350,000	  and	  500,000	  premature	  deaths	  annually	  in	  China	  are	  attributable	  to	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions.21	  In	  fact,	  air	  pollution	  has	  become	  the	  fourth	  largest	  threat	  to	  the	  health	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people,	  only	  behind	  dietary	  habits,	  heart	  disease	  and	  smoking.	  Another	  major	  health	  risk	  to	  the	  Chinese	  people	  is	  coal	  mining,	  which	  is	  estimated	  to	  account	  for	  roughly	  5%	  of	  the	  workforce.	  Coal	  mining	  is	  responsible	  for	  half	  of	  industrial	  fatalities,	  killing	  4,746	  mine	  workers	  in	  2006	  (an	  average	  of	  13	  workers	  per	  day).22	  	  Coal	  has	  also	  led	  to	  several	  obstacles	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  transportation.	  Because	  the	  majority	  of	  China’s	  coal	  production	  is	  located	  in	  the	  Western	  and	  Northern	  highlands,	  and	  
                                                21	  Malcolm	  Moore,	  “China’s	  airpocalypse	  kills	  350,000	  to	  500,000	  each	  year,”	  Telegraph	  UK,	  January	  07,	  2014,	  accessed	  February	  18,	  2016,	  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10555816/Chinas-­‐airpocalypse-­‐kills-­‐350000-­‐to-­‐500000-­‐each-­‐year.html	  	  22	  Amber	  Mehmood,	  “Chinese	  coal	  mines:	  The	  industrial	  death	  trap,”	  The	  Aga	  Khan	  University	  Hospital	  Karachi,	  September,	  2009,	  accessed	  December	  18,	  2016,	  http://ecommons.aku.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=pakistan_fhs_mc_emerg_med	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about	  60%	  of	  China’s	  population	  lives	  along	  the	  Yangtze	  River	  valley	  in	  the	  East,23	  the	  transportation	  of	  the	  coal	  is	  costly	  and	  has	  cramped	  the	  railway	  system.	  Suffering	  from	  an	  outdated	  industrial	  railway	  system,	  China	  has	  seen	  coal	  deficits	  and	  increasing	  prices	  because	  coal	  production	  has	  outpaced	  the	  capabilities	  of	  the	  railways.	  	  One	  of	  the	  largest	  steps	  by	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  to	  address	  global	  warming	  has	  actually	  become	  their	  transparency	  on	  the	  issue.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  China	  censored	  all	  comments	  on	  climate	  change’s	  effects	  on	  human	  health	  until	  recently.	  Showing	  further	  progress,	  by	  2014,	  Chinese	  news	  sources	  have	  been	  releasing	  reports	  about	  China’s	  serious	  consequences	  from	  pollution.	  China	  Daily,	  one	  of	  the	  central	  government’s	  primary	  outlets	  to	  its	  population,	  announced	  in	  an	  article	  that	  China’s	  coastal	  regions	  saw	  a	  sea	  level	  rise	  of	  three	  millimeters	  annually	  between	  1980	  and	  2014	  (which	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  world	  average).24	  Other	  articles	  point	  out	  the	  severity	  of	  sea	  level	  rise	  along	  China’s	  major	  coastline	  cities	  of	  Shanghai,	  Guangzhou,	  Hong	  Kong,	  stating	  that	  a	  rise	  of	  a	  meter	  would	  submerge	  over	  35,000	  square	  miles	  in	  these	  regions	  that	  accounted	  for	  70%	  of	  China’s	  GDP	  in	  2010.25	  Political	  transparency	  on	  climate	  change	  stepped	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  China’s	  domestic	  challenges	  when,	  in	  2009	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly,	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  Hu	  Jintao	  gave	  a	  speech	  highlighting	  China’s	  struggles	  and	  hopes	  for	  environmental	  betterment	  going	  forward:	  
                                                23	  Patrick	  Chovanec,	  “Closing	  the	  Gap	  between	  China’s	  Cost	  and	  Interior,”	  Wordpress	  Inc,	  January	  13,	  2011,	  accessed	  February	  3,	  2016,	  https://chovanec.wordpress.com/2011/01/13/closing-­‐the-­‐gap-­‐between-­‐chinas-­‐coast-­‐and-­‐interior/	  24Xinhua,	  “China’s	  sea	  level	  rise	  higher	  than	  world	  average,”	  China	  Daily,	  February	  28,	  2015,	  http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/909454.shtml	  25	  Ibid.	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Achieving	  mutual	  benefit	  and	  win-­‐win	  outcomes	  should	  be	  the	  goal	  of	  our	  effort.	  Developed	  countries	  should	  support	  developing	  countries	  in	  tackling	  climate	  change,	  since	  it	  also	  serves	  their	  long-­‐term	  interests.	  In	  the	  years	  ahead,	  China	  will	  intensify	  our	  effort	  to	  conserve	  energy	  and	  improve	  energy	  efficiency.	  We	  will	  endeavor	  to	  cut	  carbon	  dioxide	  emissions	  by	  a	  notable	  margin	  by	  2020.	  We	  will	  vigorously	  develop	  renewable	  energy	  and	  nuclear	  energy	  to	  increase	  the	  share	  of	  non-­‐fossil	  fuels	  in	  primary	  energy	  consumption	  to	  around	  15	  percent	  by	  2020.26	  	   	  General	  Secretary	  Hu	  has	  been	  instrumental	  in	  campaigning	  for	  China	  to	  lead	  human	  civilization	  into	  an	  ecological	  civilization,	  with	  development	  that	  bolsters	  harmony	  between	  nature	  and	  humans	  while	  paving	  a	  path	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  vigor.27	  Most	  significantly,	  Chinese	  government	  officials	  have	  begun	  to	  materialize	  these	  feelings	  into	  numerical	  targets	  for	  electricity	  and	  pollution	  contraction	  goals.	  	  In	  their	  11th	  five-­‐year	  plan	  (2006-­‐2010),	  a	  guideline	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  initiatives	  implemented	  by	  the	  central	  government,	  China	  vowed	  to	  reduce	  energy	  consumption	  per	  unit	  of	  DSP	  by	  20%	  in	  five	  years	  and	  diminish	  discharge	  of	  major	  pollutants	  by	  10%	  in	  the	  next	  five	  years.28	  In	  the	  12th	  five-­‐year	  plan	  was	  China’s	  announcement	  that	  they	  would	  supply	  15%	  of	  energy	  demand	  by	  2020	  from	  non-­‐fossil	  fuel	  sources.	  ‘Non-­‐fossil	  fuel	  sources’	  and	  ‘renewable	  energy	  sources’	  actually	  differ	  though	  in	  that	  nuclear	  energy	  is	  included	  as	  a	  non-­‐fossil	  source.	  	   President	  Xi	  Jinping	  has	  announced	  that	  China’s	  nuclear	  power,	  which	  currently	  accounts	  for	  3%	  of	  the	  energy	  mix,	  will	  generate	  at	  110	  power	  plants	  by	  2030,	  amounting	  
                                                26	  Federal	  News	  Service,	  “Hu	  Jintao’s	  Speech	  on	  Climate	  Change,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  September	  22,	  2009,	  accessed	  January	  14,	  2016,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23hu.text.html	  27	  Yu	  Keping,	  “Search	  for	  balance	  in	  China:	  a	  quest	  for	  dynamic	  stability,:	  Peking	  University	  East	  Asia	  Forum,	  September	  22,	  2013,	  accessed	  January	  14,	  2016,	  http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/09/22/a-­‐quest-­‐for-­‐dynamic-­‐stability	  28	  “The	  11th	  Five-­‐Year	  Plan,”	  Chinese	  Political	  Party,	  2015,	  accessed	  January	  20,	  2016,	  http://www.gov.cn/english/special/115y_index.htm	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to	  an	  investment	  of	  $79	  billion	  of	  government	  funds.29	  President	  Xi	  has	  planned	  for	  this	  increase	  to	  account	  for	  9%	  of	  China’s	  electricity	  sector,	  despite	  concerns	  still	  amidst	  regarding	  Japan’s	  Fukushima	  disaster.	  Immediately	  following	  the	  Fukushima	  disaster,	  China	  suspended	  its	  nuclear	  program	  and	  numerous	  scholars	  published	  articles	  on	  how	  the	  nuclear	  crisis	  will	  upsurge	  expenditure	  in	  renewable	  energy	  development.	  However,	  China	  has	  since	  began	  constructing	  31	  additional	  nuclear	  power	  reactors,	  which	  will	  augment	  its	  already	  large	  base	  of	  27	  nuclear	  reactors	  in	  operation.	  All	  of	  China’s	  nuclear	  reactors	  are	  located	  along	  the	  East	  coast,	  so	  that	  they	  can	  provide	  immediate	  energy	  to	  the	  heavily	  populated	  load	  centers	  of	  the	  East.	  As	  one	  can	  see	  now,	  four	  year	  after	  Fukushima,	  China	  has	  also	  relied	  on	  increased	  nuclear	  power	  generation	  to	  uncouple	  China’s	  energy	  sector	  from	  nonrenewable	  sources.	  Additionally,	  since	  China	  has	  essentially	  tapped	  all	  of	  its	  hydroelectric	  potential	  at	  20%	  of	  China’s	  total	  energy,	  both	  nuclear	  and	  wind,	  the	  two	  most	  affordable	  and	  efficient	  non-­‐fossil	  fuel	  energy	  sources	  for	  China,	  stand	  in	  the	  limelight	  as	  practical	  options	  to	  help	  reach	  national	  energy	  targets.	  	  Nuclear	  and	  wind	  actually	  work	  cohesively	  because	  nuclear	  provides	  base-­‐load	  generation,	  the	  electrical	  power	  needed	  to	  satisfy	  minimum	  energy	  demand	  daily.30	  Wind,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  used	  as	  a	  peaking	  energy	  source	  because	  it	  is	  generally	  utilized	  only	  when	  there	  are	  peaks	  in	  energy	  demand.	  Therefore,	  both	  wind	  and	  nuclear,	  which	  are	  
                                                29	  “China	  to	  invest	  $78	  bn	  to	  build	  110	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  by	  2030,	  will	  overtake	  US,”	  Firstpost	  News	  Source,	  October	  17,	  2015,	  accessed	  December	  2,	  2015,	  http://www.firstpost.com/world/china-­‐to-­‐invest-­‐78-­‐bn-­‐to-­‐build-­‐110-­‐nuclear-­‐power-­‐plants-­‐by-­‐2030-­‐will-­‐overtake-­‐us-­‐2471414.html	  	  30	  Chris	  Clarke,	  “Explainer:	  Base	  Load	  and	  Peaking	  Power,”	  KCET	  ReDefine	  Environment,	  July	  5,	  2012,	  accessed	  January	  4,	  2016,	  http://www.kcet.org/news/redefine/rewire/explainers/explainer-­‐base-­‐load-­‐and-­‐peaking-­‐power.html	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complementary	  power	  generation	  sources,	  should	  see	  increased	  political	  and	  economical	  investment	  going	  forward	  so	  as	  to	  safeguard	  the	  health	  of	  Chinese	  citizens,	  protect	  China’s	  public	  image	  and	  to	  have	  reliable	  power	  generation	  sources	  going	  forward.	  Knowing	  the	  Chinese	  government’s	  reasons	  for	  promoting	  non-­‐fossil	  fuel	  energy	  sources,	  including	  wind,	  I	  will	  now	  address	  China’s	  wind	  power	  policies	  that	  have	  enabled	  growth	  in	  the	  wind	  sector.	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Chapter	  3	  -­‐	  Chinese	  Wind	  Power	  Regulation	  
	   Addressing	  international	  calls	  for	  reductions	  in	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions,	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  has,	  since	  2000,	  invigorated	  its	  enactment	  of	  legislation	  set	  to	  increase	  investment	  and	  development	  of	  the	  wind	  sector.	  In	  this	  portion	  of	  the	  thesis,	  I	  will	  first	  provide	  an	  overview	  on	  China’s	  first	  several	  wind	  regulations	  and	  their	  outcomes.	  Following	  this	  outline,	  I	  will	  expound	  upon	  two	  wind	  power	  policies	  which	  I	  believe	  have	  been	  the	  most	  conducive	  to	  China’s	  surging	  wind	  sector.	  The	  two	  policies	  are	  the	  Renewable	  Energy	  Law	  and	  the	  FIT	  for	  wind	  development.	  Accompanying	  a	  review	  of	  the	  procedures	  of	  these	  programs	  will	  be	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  challenges	  the	  central	  government	  experiences	  with	  ineffectiveness	  of	  policy	  administration	  to	  grid	  owners	  and	  wind	  developers.31	  	  	   China’s	  wind	  power	  policies	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  by	  four	  key	  decisions:	  First,	  China	  implemented	  the	  Renewable	  Energy	  Law	  which	  compiled	  a	  plan	  and	  laid	  out	  clear	  targets	  for	  the	  penetration	  of	  renewable	  energy	  into	  the	  energy	  mix.	  Second,	  the	  competition	  in	  wind	  concession	  projects	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  lowering	  the	  cost	  of	  wind	  power	  generation.	  Third,	  China	  implemented	  a	  FIT	  policy	  and	  set	  aside	  a	  government	  fund	  to	  ensure	  the	  success	  of	  the	  program.	  Finally,	  China’s	  ability	  to	  manufacture	  wind	  turbines	  locally	  and	  provide	  policies	  to	  ensure	  domestic	  success	  has	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  success	  of	  China’s	  wind	  industry.	  
                                                31	  Luke	  Filei,	  “China’s	  renewable	  power	  projects	  policy	  and	  certain	  issues	  regarding	  enforceability	  of	  power,”	  
CMS	  Law	  Now,	  May	  10,	  2002,	  accessed	  January	  7,	  2016,	  http://www.cms-­‐lawnow.com/ealerts/2002/10/china8217s-­‐renewable-­‐power-­‐projects-­‐policy-­‐and-­‐certain-­‐issues-­‐regarding-­‐enforceability-­‐of-­‐power-­‐pur?cc_lang=en	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   The	  Renewable	  Energy	  Law	  of	  2006	  became	  the	  turning	  point	  for	  China’s	  wind	  sector	  success.	  Chinese	  Reuters	  analyst	  Wu	  Qi	  described	  the	  law	  as	  instrumental	  because	  it	  provided	  the	  structure	  for	  the	  FIT	  system.	  Through	  research,	  I	  discovered	  that	  the	  Renewable	  Energy	  Law	  however	  did	  not	  have	  the	  impact	  described	  above	  until	  amendments	  were	  added	  to	  the	  law	  in	  2007.	  Still,	  the	  law	  made	  it	  necessary	  for	  the	  Chinese	  government	  to	  coordinate	  targets	  for	  development,	  produce	  efficient	  plans,	  and	  make	  sure	  that	  such	  plans	  could	  be	  supported	  by	  sufficient	  budgets.	  In	  reading	  the	  NDRC’s	  actual	  text	  in	  Mandarin	  Chinese	  for	  the	  2006	  law,	  I	  discovered	  that	  in	  Article	  14	  the	  NDRC	  requires	  hundreds	  of	  Chinese	  ministries	  (provincial	  governments)	  to	  create	  their	  own	  renewable	  targets	  which	  must	  include	  the	  exact	  ratio	  of	  the	  province's	  energy	  which	  will	  be	  produced	  by	  renewable	  generation.32	  Article	  14	  is	  only	  one	  example	  of	  the	  several	  strengthened	  obligations	  which	  the	  NDRC	  places	  on	  provincial	  governments	  and	  grid	  companies	  to	  incorporate	  renewable	  power.	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
                                                32	  “Renewable	  Energy	  Law	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,”	  China	  News	  Source,	  February	  14,	  2011,	  accessed	  December	  20,	  2015,	  http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-­‐2010/2011-­‐02/14/content_21917464.htm	  
Image	  1:	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   Crucial	  to	  the	  success	  of	  China’s	  wind	  program	  was	  the	  revision	  of	  the	  FIT	  in	  August	  of	  2009,	  which	  strongly	  intended	  to	  bring	  profitability	  to	  the	  wind	  industry.	  The	  FIT	  separated	  China’s	  land	  mass	  into	  four	  price	  brackets	  hinged	  on	  differences	  in	  wind	  intensity.	  The	  FIT	  ranged	  from	  ¥0.51	  per	  Kilowatt	  Hour	  (KwH)	  in	  very	  windy	  areas	  to	  ¥0.61	  per	  KwH	  in	  regions	  with	  low	  wind	  intensity,	  as	  displayed	  in	  Image	  1.33	  By	  introducing	  four	  different	  tiers	  in	  pricing,	  grid	  operators	  in	  areas	  with	  low	  wind	  intensity	  will	  buy	  wind	  at	  a	  higher	  price.	  This	  allows	  the	  NDRC	  to	  ensure	  that	  less	  profitable	  opportunities	  still	  provide	  financial	  benefit.	  	  	   The	  FIT	  essentially	  offers	  wind	  developers	  a	  stagnant	  energy	  price	  for	  two	  decades	  of	  a	  wind	  farm’s	  functional	  operation.	  In	  order	  to	  successfully	  provide	  a	  guaranteed	  cost,	  the	  NDRC	  implemented	  a	  cost-­‐sharing	  mechanism	  so	  that	  no	  grid	  company	  would	  have	  to	  bear	  the	  monetary	  burden	  for	  electricity	  costs.	  Cost	  sharing	  essentially	  ensures	  that	  even	  if	  one	  grid	  companies	  province	  purchases	  significantly	  more	  wind	  farms	  than	  others,	  that	  region	  will	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  any	  penalties	  for	  purchasing	  larger	  amounts	  of	  wind	  power.	  	  	   In	  an	  effort	  to	  levelize	  the	  price	  of	  renewable	  power	  with	  the	  cheap	  costs	  of	  coal,	  the	  NEA	  announced	  in	  2006	  a	  “Trial	  Measure	  on	  Management	  of	  Cost	  Sharing	  for	  Renewable	  Power	  Generation	  Prices	  and	  Expenses.”	  This	  mandated	  that	  any	  differences	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  renewable	  energy	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  coal	  power	  would	  be	  shared	  at	  the	  regional	  level.	  This	  was	  done	  by	  opening	  a	  trade	  system	  for	  renewable	  power	  generation	  surcharge	  credits.	  Any	  companies	  who	  purchased	  wind	  at	  a	  surcharge	  price,	  that	  is	  the	  price	  above	  coal	  power,	  would	  be	  granted	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  credits	  which	  they	  could	  then	  sell	  to	  
                                                33	  “The	  National	  Development	  and	  Reform	  Comission	  announced	  regional	  feed-­‐in	  tariffs	  for	  PV	  projects	  and	  new	  distributed	  PV	  subsidy	  specifics,	  Azure	  International,	  March	  18,	  2013.	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companies	  who	  are	  looking	  for	  credits.	  The	  idea	  is	  similar	  to	  a	  cap	  and	  trade	  system,	  however	  the	  NDRC	  overlooks	  and	  verifies	  that	  credit	  trading	  in	  this	  circumstance.	  	  	   Moving	  away	  from	  the	  cost	  sharing	  framework	  for	  China’s	  renewables,	  I	  will	  now	  describe	  China’s	  FIT,	  which	  has	  been	  keystone	  to	  incentivizing	  producers	  and	  safeguarding	  the	  profitability	  of	  wind	  power.	  China’s	  FIT	  is	  considered	  a	  market	  independent	  FIT	  because	  it	  operates	  on	  a	  fixed	  price	  model,	  providing	  constant	  prices	  regardless	  of	  the	  market’s	  energy	  prices.	  Changes	  in	  market	  conditions	  such	  as	  inflation	  or	  prices	  of	  oil	  would	  therefore	  not	  affect	  the	  FIT	  prices.	  The	  fundamental	  idea	  of	  the	  FIT	  is	  to	  provide	  an	  incentive	  for	  wind	  developers	  to	  build	  wind	  farms	  in	  a	  country	  where	  coal-­‐fired	  power	  prices	  are	  significantly	  less	  than	  those	  for	  wind	  generation.	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  market-­‐independent	  FIT	  will	  establish	  higher	  revenues	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  a	  wind	  farm.	  The	  success	  of	  the	  FIT	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  China’s	  increase	  in	  wind	  capacity	  of	  37,928	  Megawatts	  (MW)	  over	  2010	  and	  2011,	  surpassing	  the	  U.S.	  and	  becoming	  home	  to	  the	  world’s	  largest	  wind	  power	  installed	  capacity.34	  	   It	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  leave	  out	  a	  major	  drawback	  of	  China’s	  FIT:	  while	  the	  market-­‐independent	  FIT	  does	  increase	  both	  the	  speed	  and	  financial	  backing	  necessary	  to	  build	  wind	  turbines,	  it	  accomplishes	  both	  of	  these	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  efficiency.	  With	  regard	  to	  wind	  turbines,	  efficiency	  refers	  to	  a	  wind	  farm’s	  capacity	  factor,	  which	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  energy	  actually	  produced	  to	  the	  maximum	  amount	  of	  energy	  that	  a	  wind	  farm	  could	  produce	  at	  full	  capacity.	  An	  example	  would	  be	  if	  a	  grid	  was	  connected	  to	  20	  wind	  farms,	  but	  could	  only	  efficiently	  receive	  energy	  from	  4	  of	  them	  because	  the	  capacity	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  demand.	  
                                                34	  J.	  Matthew	  Roney,	  “World	  Wind	  Power	  Climbs	  to	  New	  Record	  in	  2011,”	  Earth	  Policy	  Institute,	  March	  14,	  2012,	  accessed	  February	  15,	  2016,	  http://www.earth-­‐policy.org/indicators/C49/wind_power_2012	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For	  that	  reason,	  the	  capacity	  factor	  for	  those	  20	  wind	  farms	  would	  be	  20%,	  which	  is	  actually	  not	  much	  lower	  than	  true	  China’s	  turbine	  capacity	  factors.	  	   In	  comparison	  to	  other	  nations,	  China’s	  turbine	  capacity	  factors	  are	  actually	  very	  low,	  meaning	  that	  their	  wind	  farms	  actually	  generate	  little	  electricity.	  Statistics	  from	  the	  IEA	  in	  2012	  stated	  that	  1	  MW	  of	  wind	  capacity	  produce	  1,956	  Megawatt	  Hours	  (MwH)	  of	  electricity	  in	  the	  U.S.	  annually	  while	  it	  produced	  only	  879	  MwH	  in	  China.35	  While	  one	  could	  point	  to	  low	  winds	  for	  the	  reason	  of	  a	  wind	  farm	  to	  have	  low	  capacity	  factor,	  the	  truth	  cuts	  much	  deeper	  for	  China.	  Their	  issues	  are	  mainly	  caused	  by	  an	  outdated	  energy	  grid	  and	  inefficient	  transmission	  lines	  which	  haven’t	  even	  been	  extended	  to	  many	  of	  the	  wind	  farms.	  At	  the	  core,	  China	  has	  built	  thousands	  of	  wind	  farms	  which	  are	  essentially	  not	  functional	  until	  they	  can	  be	  grid-­‐connected.	  Why	  would	  they	  do	  this?	  This	  issue	  of	  installed	  capacity	  and	  inefficient	  construction	  by	  the	  Chinese	  will	  be	  covered	  in	  depth	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  and	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  China’s	  barriers	  to	  wind	  success.	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Chapter	  4:	  Grid	  Integration	  and	  Curtailment	  Issues	  While	  before	  2002	  China’s	  energy	  supply	  was	  managed	  by	  China’s	  provincial	  governments,	  since	  the	  inception	  of	  China’s	  power	  systems	  reform	  that	  year,	  the	  Chinese	  power	  grid	  has	  been	  owned	  and	  operated	  by	  the	  two	  colossal	  grid	  companies,	  CSPG	  and	  SGCC.	  The	  two	  companies,	  both	  still	  technically	  SOEs,	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  planning	  and	  allocation,	  financial	  decision-­‐making,	  power	  transmission	  and	  distribution,	  and	  lastly	  the	  operation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  entire	  grid	  infrastructure.36	  Constructing	  a	  reliable,	  efficient,	  and	  successful	  grid	  network	  is,	  as	  you	  will	  see,	  not	  easy	  nor	  cheap.	  Making	  matters	  worse,	  it	  seems	  the	  ruling	  party	  is	  managing	  certain	  investment	  decisions	  in	  the	  wrong	  order,	  because	  it	  has	  resulted	  in	  China	  becoming	  a	  leader	  in	  building	  the	  world’s	  most	  wind	  turbines	  that	  do	  not	  generate	  electricity.	  	  The	  SGCC	  and	  CSPG,	  though,	  do	  not	  control	  the	  national	  grid	  of	  China.	  This	  is	  because	  there	  is	  no	  national	  grid.	  Alternatively,	  China	  has	  six	  regional	  grids,	  five	  of	  which	  are	  owned	  and	  operated	  by	  the	  SGCC	  while	  the	  CSPG	  operates	  the	  final	  grid.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  limited	  monitoring	  or	  communication	  between	  the	  regional	  grids	  to	  allow	  for	  any	  sharing	  to	  mitigate	  any	  localized	  shortages.	  The	  U.S.	  comparatively	  was	  forced	  into	  better	  grid	  system	  coordination	  by	  blackouts.	  Peaking	  demand	  rises	  in	  China	  in	  the	  late	  spring	  and	  early	  summer	  as	  temperatures	  heat	  up	  and	  air	  conditioning	  is	  necessary.	  Likewise,	  hydropower	  and	  reservoir	  levels	  decrease	  until	  the	  wet	  season	  arrives	  in	  summer,	  resulting	  in	  a	  need	  for	  expensive	  and/or	  environmentally-­‐damaging	  fossil	  fuels	  to	  be	  imported.	  This	  is	  disadvantageous	  to	  China	  as	  its	  coal	  resources	  are	  already	  scarce.	  The	  
                                                36	  Xin	  Li,	  “Decarbonizing	  China’s	  power	  system	  with	  wind	  power,”	  PhD	  diss.,	  Oxford	  Institute,	  January	  2015,	  https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/01/EL-­‐11.pdf	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grid’s	  drawbacks	  can	  be	  categorized	  as	  a	  network	  issue,	  as	  what	  is	  clear	  here	  is	  the	  need	  for	  a	  unified	  grid	  system	  such	  as	  the	  high-­‐efficiency	  Smart	  Grid	  system.	  Two	  additional	  paramount	  	  barriers	  to	  China’s	  wind	  industry	  success	  are	  the	  issues	  of	  grid	  integration	  and	  curtailment.	  Because	  the	  majority	  of	  China’s	  wind	  development	  to	  date	  has	  been	  centered	  in	  massive	  wind	  farms	  which	  are	  thousand	  of	  miles	  away	  from	  load	  centers,	  China	  has	  struggled	  to	  devise	  an	  efficient	  method	  to	  transmit	  that	  energy	  from	  the	  wind-­‐hub	  centers	  of	  the	  West	  to	  the	  consumer	  load	  centers	  of	  the	  East.	  For	  example,	  the	  installed	  capacity	  of	  wind	  power	  in	  Gansu,	  Northern	  Hebei,	  and	  Western	  and	  Eastern	  Inner	  Mongolia	  totals	  amounts	  to	  50%	  of	  China’s	  total.37	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  the	  electricity	  consumption	  in	  these	  regions	  accounts	  for	  only	  10%	  of	  China's	  total.	  Hence,	  a	  reliable	  and	  efficient	  transmission	  system	  is	  desperately	  needed	  to	  send	  the	  produced	  wind	  energy	  to	  load	  centers	  of	  the	  East,	  such	  as	  Shanghai.	  	  	   While	  many	  laws	  state	  that	  renewable	  energy	  globally	  should	  be	  given	  preferred	  access	  to	  the	  energy	  grid,	  China’s	  current	  wind	  power	  policies	  currently	  offer	  too	  few	  financial	  incentives	  for	  grid	  companies	  to	  build	  the	  high-­‐efficiency	  voltage	  transmission	  lines	  necessary	  transmit	  power	  from	  the	  Northwest	  to	  the	  industrial	  centers	  in	  the	  Southeast.	  While	  China	  has	  established	  itself	  as	  the	  leading	  wind	  turbine	  producer	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  also	  boasts	  that	  it	  leads	  the	  world	  in	  wind	  installed	  capacity,	  National	  Energy	  Administration	  officials	  reported	  in	  2012	  that	  as	  many	  as	  one-­‐third	  of	  China’s	  wind	  farms	  are	  not	  connected	  to	  the	  transmission	  grid.	  Citigroup	  published	  a	  report	  that,	  in	  2013,	  as	  
                                                37	  Yixin	  Dai,	  “The	  Innovation	  Path	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Wind	  Power	  Industry,”	  PhD	  Diss.,	  German	  Development	  Institute,	  2014,	  https://www.die-­‐gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_32.2014_neu.pdf	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many	  as	  40%	  of	  Chinese	  wind	  turbines	  were	  not	  connected	  to	  the	  energy	  grid.38	  While	  this	  is	  attributable	  in	  part	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  incentives	  for	  grid	  corporations	  to	  interconnect	  China’s	  energy	  network,	  one	  thing	  is	  for	  sure	  -­‐	  the	  disconnected	  wind	  turbines	  are	  a	  significant	  waste	  of	  investment	  and	  energy.	  	  	   Wind	  farms	  can	  be	  connected	  to	  energy	  grids	  in	  two	  ways.	  	  The	  first	  option,	  the	  transmission	  network,	  will	  require	  transformers	  to	  support	  higher	  voltages	  than	  if	  the	  farm	  were	  connected	  via	  the	  distribution	  network.	  Usually,	  each	  wind	  turbine	  in	  a	  farm	  will	  be	  connected	  to	  a	  step-­‐up	  transformer,	  located	  at	  the	  base	  of	  the	  wind	  turbine,	  which	  is	  used	  to	  increase	  the	  generating	  output	  of	  the	  turbine.	  This	  is	  displayed	  by	  image	  2.	  An	  entire	  wind	  farm	  will	  host	  a	  collection	  of	  grounding	  transformers	  which	  will	  accumulate	  generated	  power	  and	  transmit	  it	  to	  a	  collector	  step-­‐up	  transformer.39	  From	  that	  substation,	  the	  energy	  will	  subsequently	  be	  transported	  to	  the	  energy	  grid.	  As	  a	  result,	  turbines	  connected	  by	  the	  transmission	  network	  are	  more	  costly	  due	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  installing	  transformers.	  The	  high	  cost	  of	  transformers	  represents	  a	  general	  issue	  across	  wind	  power.	  	   China,	  in	  2012,	  began	  to	  actively	  seek	  to	  alleviate	  
                                                38	  Vivian	  Wai-­‐yin	  Kwok,	  “Weaknesses	  in	  Chinese	  Wind	  Power,”	  Forbes,	  July	  20,	  2009,	  accessed	  January	  20,	  2016,	  http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/20/china-­‐wind-­‐power-­‐business-­‐energy-­‐china.html	  39	  “How	  are	  Transformers	  Integrated	  into	  Wind	  Farms?”	  Transformer	  Protector,	  December	  2014,	  accessed	  December	  14,	  2016,	  http://www.transproco.com/how-­‐are-­‐transformers-­‐integrated-­‐into-­‐wind-­‐farms/	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their	  transmission	  issues	  by	  beginning	  development	  of	  high-­‐efficiency	  reliable	  transmission	  lines.	  Generally,	  if	  the	  wind	  farm	  is	  not	  far	  from	  the	  point	  of	  grid	  connection,	  a	  high	  voltage	  alternating	  current	  (HVAC)	  connection	  is	  typically	  used.	  Because	  China’s	  issue	  is	  long-­‐range,	  it	  has	  been	  quickly	  building	  high	  voltage	  direct	  current	  (HVDC)	  transmission	  lines.	  HVDC	  lines	  are	  crucial	  for	  China’s	  wind	  network	  development	  because	  they’re	  able	  to	  reduce	  losses	  by	  converting	  energy	  from	  an	  alternating	  current,	  to	  a	  direct	  current,	  and	  back	  again	  to	  an	  alternating	  current	  at	  extremely	  high-­‐speeds	  and	  efficiency.	  In	  order	  to	  address	  blockages	  in	  the	  transmission	  system,	  the	  State	  Grid	  and	  South	  Grid	  construction	  corporations	  of	  China	  are	  in	  the	  process	  of	  installing	  twelve	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  long	  range	  transmission	  lines.	  Eight	  of	  the	  twelve	  lines	  will	  be	  HVDC,	  one	  of	  which	  will	  connect	  the	  Inner	  Mongolia	  and	  Jilin	  provinces	  to	  the	  congested	  Eastern	  centers	  where	  it's	  needed.	  	   Geopolitically,	  national	  renewable	  organizations	  normally	  develop	  their	  own	  economic	  framework	  for	  who	  bears	  the	  costs	  for	  an	  energy	  source	  to	  be	  connected	  to	  the	  grid.	  In	  many	  countries,	  the	  wind	  farm	  owner	  is	  responsible	  for	  these	  costs.	  Alternatively,	  as	  seen	  in	  China,	  the	  transmission	  system	  operator	  must	  bear	  the	  cost	  of	  whatever	  transmission	  system	  modifications	  are	  necessary	  for	  wind	  farm	  connection.	  The	  cost	  of	  grid	  connection	  accumulates	  to	  about	  15%	  of	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  an	  onshore	  wind	  farm.40	  	   A	  further	  issue	  for	  China’s	  wind	  industry	  is	  that	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  grid	  has	  been	  much	  slower	  than	  the	  scale	  of	  wind	  power	  expansion.	  From	  2010-­‐2015,	  for	  example,	  energy	  consumption	  in	  the	  Northeast	  grew	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  5%	  annually,	  whilst	  the	  mean	  yearly	  increase	  of	  installed	  wind	  power	  capacity	  was	  25%.	  Clearly	  seen,	  the	  rate	  of	  growth	  of	  wind	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  “Renewable	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  1:	  Power	  Sector,	  Issue	  5/5,	  accessed	  January	  20,	  2016,	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power	  potential	  is	  five	  times	  that	  of	  regional	  electricity	  demand.	  The	  fundamental	  cause	  of	  the	  oversupply	  is	  the	  incapability	  of	  China’s	  regional	  grids	  and	  transmission	  systems.	  Notwithstanding	  that	  China	  improved	  its	  wind	  curtailment	  problem	  thanks	  to	  endeavors	  by	  all	  relevant	  regions	  in	  2013	  and	  2014,	  the	  ratio	  of	  wind	  curtailment	  in	  both	  Inner	  Mongolias,	  Hebei,	  and	  Heilongjiang	  were	  still	  well	  above	  10%,	  and	  the	  ratios	  for	  Jilin	  and	  Gansu	  approached	  20%.41	  A	  2016	  Bloomberg	  news	  report	  summed	  it	  up	  as	  that	  “China’s	  wind	  farm	  operators	  have	  suffered	  from	  idled	  capacity	  for	  years	  as	  the	  rush	  to	  build	  projects	  in	  the	  windiest	  areas	  of	  the	  nation	  surpassed	  the	  grid’s	  ability	  to	  absorb	  and	  transmit	  the	  power.”42	  	  	   In	  addition,	  in	  the	  Three	  North	  (Heilongjiang,	  Jilin,	  and	  Liaoning)	  region	  where	  China’s	  wind	  resources	  are	  plentiful,	  flexible	  power	  sources	  are	  limited,	  and	  the	  energy	  structure	  is	  simple:	  pumped	  storage	  and	  gas	  power	  solely	  accounted	  for	  just	  2%	  of	  the	  total	  energy	  makeup.	  As	  a	  result,	  capability	  for	  peak	  regulation,	  especially	  in	  the	  frigid	  eight-­‐month	  long	  winters	  of	  northern	  China	  when	  household	  heating	  systems	  are	  on	  at	  full-­‐blast,	  is	  usually	  very	  limited.	  In	  other	  words,	  local	  grid	  companies	  restrict	  the	  percentage	  of	  potential	  wind	  power	  penetration	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  more	  reliable,	  and	  more	  environmentally-­‐damaging,	  coal	  power.	  It	  is	  reported	  that	  throughout	  the	  winter	  of	  2010,	  Inner	  Mongolia	  wind	  companies	  forfeited	  a	  loss	  of	  roughly	  $80	  million	  in	  revenue	  due	  to	  approximately	  950	  million	  kilowatt-­‐hours	  of	  curtailed	  wind	  generation.43	  Ironically,	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  
                                                41	  Diana	  Furchtgott-­‐Roth,	  “Regulating	  to	  Disaster:	  How	  Green	  Jobs	  Policies	  Are	  Damaging	  America's	  
Economy,”	  (New	  York:	  Encounter	  Books	  2012),	  97-­‐98.	  42	  “China’s	  Idled	  Wind	  Turbines	  Rise	  in	  2015	  After	  Record	  Installs,”	  Bloomberg	  News,	  February	  3,	  2016,	  accessed	  February	  26,	  2016,	  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-­‐02-­‐03/china-­‐s-­‐idled-­‐wind-­‐turbines-­‐rise-­‐in-­‐2015-­‐after-­‐record-­‐installs	  43	  Ibid.	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of	  intentionally	  reducing	  wind	  usage	  during	  China’s	  winter	  is	  substantial	  because	  wind	  blows	  significantly	  stronger	  in	  that	  season.	  	  Due	  to	  a	  compact	  market	  size,	  a	  lack	  of	  flexible	  electricity	  capability,	  and	  few	  peak	  resources,	  the	  majority	  of	  China’s	  current	  wind	  power	  resources	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  remaining	  sunk	  costs.44	  The	  SGCC	  and	  CSPG	  proposed	  in	  2014	  the	  West	  East	  Electricity	  Transfer	  Project,	  which	  aims	  to	  build	  four	  transmission	  lines	  linking	  together	  the	  wind-­‐heavy	  Eastern	  Inner	  Mongolia	  with	  Shandong	  and	  Jiangsu,	  and	  the	  wind	  concentrated	  Western	  Inner	  Mongolia	  to	  Tianjin	  and	  Shaodong.	  The	  lines	  will	  have	  capacities	  for	  the	  transmission	  of	  6-­‐9	  Gigawatts	  (GW)	  each	  and,	  due	  to	  a	  hefty	  state-­‐provided	  investment	  of	  ¥85	  billion,	  are	  on	  track	  to	  be	  completed	  for	  2017	  and	  2020,	  respectively.	  Such	  developments	  make	  a	  substantial	  declaration	  to	  both	  potential	  domestic	  wind	  developers	  as	  well	  as	  global	  environmentalists	  that	  China	  is	  taking	  strides	  towards	  achieving	  a	  renewable	  economy.	  Ultimately,	  unless	  several	  HVDC	  lines	  are	  built	  quickly	  from	  the	  Three	  North	  region	  to	  the	  Southeast,	  any	  additional	  construction	  of	  large-­‐scale	  wind	  farms	  in	  the	  region	  would	  be	  a	  foolish	  waste	  of	  resources	  -­‐	  and	  such	  resources	  could	  be	  more	  efficiently	  allocated	  towards	  grid	  and	  transmission	  development.	  	   Honestly,	  how	  could	  the	  world’s	  arguably	  largest	  economy	  continue	  to	  build	  thousands	  of	  individual	  wind	  turbines	  and	  leave	  them	  operational	  yet	  unconnected?	  “A	  nationwide	  transmission	  line	  takes	  three	  to	  five	  years	  to	  build,	  but	  a	  wind	  farm	  only	  takes	  a	  year	  to	  build,	  said	  former	  Goldwind	  CEO	  Yu	  Wuming.	  And	  that’s	  why,	  said	  Goldwind’s	  Zhu	  Xinxiang,	  “40	  percent	  of	  the	  electricity	  generated	  by	  Dabancheng	  in	  the	  past	  year	  went	  
                                                44	  Li	  Junfeng,	  “2014	  China	  Wind	  Power	  Review	  and	  Outlook,”	  Chinese	  Renewable	  Energy	  Industries	  Association,	  January	  2015,	  accessed	  January	  14,	  2016,	  http://www.gwec.net/wp-­‐content/uploads/2012/06/2014%E9%A3%8E%E7%94%B5%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A2%E8%8B%B1%E6%96%87-­‐20150317.pdf	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nowhere.	  The	  energy	  could	  have	  powered	  a	  million	  homes,	  preventing	  air	  pollution	  and	  reducing	  China’s	  carbon	  footprint,	  but	  there	  weren’t	  transmission	  lines	  in	  place	  to	  carry	  it	  all.”45	   China	  became	  the	  world’s	  first	  country	  to	  pass	  the	  100	  GW	  mark	  for	  installed	  capacity,	  with	  a	  total	  of	  145,100	  MW	  of	  wind	  turbines	  installed	  to	  date.	  They	  also	  broke	  the	  record	  for	  the	  first	  time	  a	  single	  country	  installed	  more	  than	  20	  GW	  in	  a	  year,	  2015.	  The	  greater	  than	  anticipated	  installations	  were	  attributable	  to	  the	  NDRC’s	  proposed	  reduction	  to	  the	  onshore	  FIT,	  which	  provoked	  wind	  developers	  to	  build	  quickly	  before	  costs	  increased	  in	  early	  2016.	  While	  this	  is	  a	  rational	  decision,	  it	  is	  of	  course	  very	  costly.	  But	  if	  there	  is	  one	  term	  here	  that	  should	  be	  your	  focus,	  it	  is	  installed	  capacity.	  It	  is	  the	  only	  statistic	  that	  China	  will	  publicly	  disclose	  regarding	  their	  wind	  successes.	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  and	  why?	  	  A	  wind	  farm	  with	  an	  installed	  capacity	  of	  100	  MW	  means	  that	  with	  optimal	  wind	  conditions,	  that	  entire	  wind	  farm	  can	  produce	  100	  MW	  of	  electricity	  in	  one	  hour.46	  Technically,	  because	  each	  1.5-­‐2	  MW	  turbine	  can	  power	  about	  332	  homes,	  China’s	  114,609	  MW	  of	  installed	  capacity	  could	  power	  over	  38	  million	  Chinese	  homes.	  Instead,	  because	  wind	  power	  depends	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  wind	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  turbine	  to	  capture	  that	  wind,	  turbines	  have	  a	  capacity	  factor	  calculated	  by	  measuring	  the	  actual	  turbine	  output	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  its	  maximum	  generation	  capacity.	  Chinese	  wind	  turbines,	  which	  can	  typically	  generate	  between	  1.5-­‐2	  MW	  per	  turbine,	  have	  an	  average	  annual	  capacity	  factor	  of	  18%	  -­‐	  
                                                45	  Rob	  Schmitz,	  “China	  taps	  faraway	  frontier	  for	  renewable	  energy,”	  Marketplace	  News,	  December	  02,	  2015,	  accessed	  January	  25,	  2016,	  http://www.marketplace.org/2015/12/02/world/china-­‐taps-­‐faraway-­‐frontier-­‐renewable-­‐energy	  46	  “Installed	  Capacity	  Definition,”	  Exploring	  Green	  Technology,	  July	  2012,	  accessed	  December	  21,	  2015,	  http://exploringgreentechnology.com/glossary/installed-­‐capacity-­‐definition/	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meaning	  that	  a	  2	  MW	  turbine	  in	  reality	  generates	  on	  average	  0.4	  MW	  annually.47	  The	  80%	  unused	  power	  potential	  of	  the	  wind	  turbine	  is	  caused	  by	  a	  mixture	  between	  grid	  integration	  and	  curtailment	  issues.	  This	  is	  significantly	  lower	  than	  the	  US	  capacity	  factor	  of	  30%	  annually	  and	  this	  is	  primarily	  due	  to	  the	  US	  Smart	  Grid	  system,	  higher	  efficiency	  US	  wind	  turbines,	  and	  little-­‐to-­‐no	  intentional	  wind	  curtailment.	  	  Therefore,	  as	  displayed	  in	  figure	  3,	  while	  the	  Chinese	  wind	  sector	  is	  larger	  than	  that	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  U.S.	  systems	  are	  about	  twice	  as	  effective.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  With	  rising	  global	  recognition	  of	  the	  disaster	  on	  the	  anthropocene,	  and	  a	  country	  like	  China	  acting	  as	  the	  factory	  for	  nearly	  all	  global	  markets,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  that	  China	  would	  want	  to	  spotlight	  their	  environmental	  successes	  so	  as	  to	  develop	  a	  clean-­‐energy	  
                                                47	  “Presenting	  the	  facts	  about	  industrial	  wind	  power,”	  National	  Wind	  Watch,	  September	  2014,	  accessed	  January	  24,	  2016,	  https://www.wind-­‐watch.org/faq-­‐output.php	  
Figure	  3:	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international	  reputation.	  By	  publicizing	  their	  colossal	  growth	  of	  installed	  capacity,	  China	  is	  able	  to	  gloat	  to	  environmental	  protection	  agencies	  that	  they	  have	  the	  largest	  wind	  power	  potential	  capacity	  in	  the	  world.	  As	  explained	  before,	  much	  less	  than	  half	  of	  these	  wind	  turbines	  are	  even	  running	  and	  of	  those	  that	  are,	  they	  are	  still	  subject	  to	  their	  capacity	  factors	  of	  about	  20%.	  Henceforth,	  while	  the	  Chinese	  party	  points	  to	  the	  statistic	  that	  6%	  of	  their	  total	  national	  electricity	  mix	  is	  wind	  generated,	  they	  are	  deceiving	  us.	  Wind	  power	  which	  actually	  penetrates	  the	  Chinese	  grid	  solely	  accounted	  for	  2.78%	  of	  national	  electricity	  consumption.	  The	  vice	  chairman	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Wind	  Energy	  Association	  (CWEA),	  Shi	  Fengpei,	  demonstrated	  in	  2015	  that	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  only	  sets	  national	  energy	  goals	  and	  documents	  statistics	  based	  upon	  installed	  capacity.	  Fengpei	  grieves	  that	  the	  CCP	  avoids	  disclosing	  any	  measures	  of	  true	  electricity	  generation	  from	  wind.48	  	  	   With	  the	  headway	  from	  the	  West	  East	  Electricity	  Transfer	  Project,	  China	  has	  disclosed	  targets	  for	  national	  transmission	  capacity	  to	  reach	  300	  GW	  by	  2020	  and	  400	  GW	  by	  2030.	  One	  must	  remember	  that	  installed	  capacity	  is	  useless	  without	  transmission	  capacity	  and,	  to	  that	  subject,	  we	  come	  to	  two	  important	  questions:	  whether	  wind	  be	  given	  priority	  access	  to	  the	  transmission	  lines	  and	  what	  capacity	  of	  the	  total	  will	  be	  attributable	  to	  wind	  power?	  Currently,	  there	  lies	  no	  answer	  to	  these	  questions,	  but	  they	  certainly	  provoke	  a	  topic	  for	  future	  research.	  	   Incorporating	  wind	  power	  into	  any	  national	  energy	  system	  requires	  reform	  on	  a	  grand	  scale	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  optimal	  efficiency	  and	  integration.	  Instead	  of	  building	  from	  the	  ground	  up,	  hence	  beginning	  with	  the	  grid	  modifications	  and	  later	  constructing	  
                                                48	  Shi	  Fengpei,	  “Booming	  Wind	  Power	  Market	  and	  Industry	  in	  China,”	  (Report,	  Chinese	  Wind	  Power	  Association,	  2014),	  8	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Chapter	  5:	  Smart	  Grid	  Analysis	  	  	  	   If	  you	  wanted	  to	  transport	  water	  from	  the	  Adirondacks	  down	  to	  New	  York	  City,	  would	  you	  start	  by	  pouring	  water	  down	  the	  mountains?	  No,	  because	  that’s	  senseless.	  But	  China	  has	  done	  something	  not	  much	  different	  by	  proposing	  to	  transport	  energy	  from	  the	  Northwest	  of	  China	  to	  the	  East	  without	  connecting	  most	  of	  their	  wind	  turbine	  fleet	  to	  the	  energy	  grid.	  Both	  strategies	  are	  pointless,	  and	  they	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  building	  from	  the	  foundation	  up.	  Attempting	  to	  decarbonize	  China’s	  power	  system	  using	  wind	  power	  without	  an	  efficient	  energy	  grid	  is	  pointless.	  China	  needs	  a	  power	  system	  which	  can	  support	  a	  variety	  of	  energy	  resources	  and	  thousand-­‐mile-­‐distances	  all	  in	  the	  name	  of	  developing	  a	  renewable-­‐based	  low	  carbon	  energy	  system.	  China	  needs	  a	  strong	  regional	  grid	  system	  paired	  with	  an	  interconnection	  of	  each	  of	  these.	  China	  needs	  a	  Smart	  Grid	  -­‐	  and	  fast.	  	  	   The	  Smart	  Grid,	  devoted	  to	  creating	  a	  cleaner	  and	  more	  efficient	  energy	  system,	  is	  designed	  with	  the	  intention	  to	  decrease	  carbon	  emissions,	  to	  resist	  weather-­‐related	  and	  cyber-­‐related	  disturbances,	  and	  to	  manage	  independently	  with	  high	  efficiency.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  achieve	  total	  reliability,	  the	  Smart	  Grid	  is	  made	  capable	  of	  instantaneous	  inspection,	  monitoring,	  and	  communication.	  Because	  of	  its	  efficient	  structure	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  capabilities,	  the	  Smart	  Grid	  is	  the	  optimal	  choice	  for	  China	  to	  ensure	  a	  renewable	  future.	  	   A	  Smart	  Grid	  will	  be	  influential	  for	  the	  production	  of	  the	  Chinese	  renewable-­‐based	  low	  carbon	  energy	  system	  for	  three	  primary	  reasons.	  First,	  the	  Smart	  Grid	  can	  accommodate	  the	  integration	  of	  all	  renewable	  power	  generation	  sources	  in	  both	  concentrated	  and	  distributed	  ways.	  With	  this	  functionality,	  the	  Grid	  can	  optimally	  transmit	  energy	  from	  regional	  grids	  all	  the	  way	  to	  load	  centers	  thousands	  of	  miles	  away.	  Secondly,	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China	  has	  a	  major	  structural	  advantage	  here	  because	  their	  power	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  sector	  is	  government	  owned	  by	  means	  of	  the	  SGCC	  and	  CSPG.	  Here,	  China	  can	  make	  a	  great	  leap	  forward	  by	  using	  not	  only	  the	  government	  ownership	  of	  the	  grid	  sector,	  but	  also	  the	  Chinese	  market’s	  tendency	  to	  maintain	  low	  equipment	  costs.	  Financially,	  as	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  state-­‐owned	  SGCC	  is	  extremely	  wealthy	  and	  powerful.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  government’s	  central	  role	  in	  the	  economy	  can	  expedite	  China’s	  Smart	  Grid	  development	  and,	  thereby,	  save	  China	  annually	  approximately	  $2	  billion	  in	  net	  losses	  caused	  by	  idle	  turbines.	  In	  other	  words,	  ironically	  speaking,	  centralization	  here	  actually	  helps.	  	  	   While	  supply	  side	  issues,	  specifically	  grid-­‐related,	  were	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  China’s	  demand	  side	  faces	  its	  own	  difficulties.	  Because	  China’s	  population	  is	  rapidly	  urbanizing	  to	  cities	  on	  the	  East	  Coast	  and	  Central	  China,	  areas	  which	  are	  several	  thousand	  miles	  from	  China’s	  most	  wind-­‐concentrated	  provinces,	  China	  has	  struggled	  to	  meet	  the	  high	  energy	  demand.	  McKinsey,	  a	  worldwide	  management	  and	  consulting	  firm,	  reported	  in	  2015	  that	  60	  percent	  of	  Chinese	  people	  now	  live	  in	  urban	  environments,	  as	  compared	  to	  only	  20	  percent	  when	  China	  opened	  as	  a	  free	  market	  economy	  under	  Deng	  Xiaoping	  in	  1979.	  This	  expansion	  in	  urbanization	  drives	  a	  colossal	  demand	  for	  power	  consumption	  which,	  given	  the	  actual	  diurnal	  patterns	  of	  activity,	  leads	  to	  peaks	  and	  troughs	  in	  the	  load	  system.	  The	  power	  load	  in	  provinces	  controlled	  under	  the	  SGCC	  in	  2014	  and	  2015	  increase	  substantially,	  by	  13%	  annually,	  which	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  load	  increases	  of	  12%,	  9%,	  and	  8%	  in	  2011,	  2012,	  and	  2013	  respectively.49	  Because	  wind	  is	  most	  efficient	  as	  a	  peaking	  power,	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  Smart	  Grid	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  both	  the	  energy-­‐
                                                49	  Li	  Junfeng,	  “2014	  China	  Wind	  Power	  Review	  and	  Outlook,”	  2.	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demanding	  load	  centers	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  energy	  sector	  by	  means	  of	  a	  levelized	  energy	  demand	  and	  supply.	  Essentially,	  a	  Smart	  Grid	  ensures	  efficiency	  by	  making	  sure	  that	  supply	  of	  energy	  is	  equal	  to	  demand	  for	  energy,	  and	  that	  any	  inconsistencies	  in	  that	  will	  be	  accounted	  for.	  	  	  	   Because	  China’s	  largest	  issues	  are	  regional	  grid	  integration	  and	  curtailment,	  the	  majority	  of	  China’s	  current	  Smart	  Grid	  investment	  is	  in	  transmission,	  distribution	  automation,	  and	  automatic	  metering	  reading.50	  Distribution	  automation	  is	  used	  to	  improve	  reliability	  in	  the	  grid	  system	  by	  use	  of	  real-­‐time	  monitoring	  and	  control	  of	  energy	  distribution.51	  Automatic	  metering	  reading	  ensures	  the	  transfer	  of	  technological	  information,	  such	  as	  consumption	  and	  diagnostic	  readings,	  from	  energy	  systems	  to	  central	  databases	  for	  payment,	  troubleshooting,	  and	  inspection	  purposes.52	  These	  two	  systems	  coupled	  together	  will	  allow	  real-­‐time	  monitoring	  of	  the	  energy	  grid	  system,	  thereby	  enhancing	  reliability,	  energy	  efficiency,	  and	  cost	  efficiency.	  China’s	  Smart	  Grid	  development	  will	  target	  four	  pivotal	  aspects	  of	  the	  power	  system:	  transmission,	  distribution,	  consumption,	  and	  power-­‐generation.	  	  China’s	  Strong	  Smart	  Grid	  plan	  was	  pioneered	  in	  May	  of	  2009	  by	  the	  SGCC.	  The	  proposal	  highlighted	  seven	  crucial	  aspects	  to	  developing	  China’s	  Smart	  Grid	  which	  are	  laid	  out	  in	  table	  1.	  The	  eight-­‐year	  plan,	  costing	  currently	  $92	  billion	  USD,	  is	  split	  into	  three	  phases	  within	  the	  12th	  Five-­‐year	  plan:	  Phase	  one	  focuses	  on	  necessary	  research	  and	  development	  by	  means	  of	  planning	  and	  piloting	  projects.	  This	  plan,	  set	  for	  2009-­‐2010,	  has	  
                                                50	  Jianbo	  Yi,	  “Innovative	  Testing	  and	  Measurement	  Solutions	  for	  Smart	  Grid,”	  Wiley	  Publishers,	  April	  24,	  2015,	  accessed	  via	  Schaffer	  Library	  Online	  January	  10,	  2016.	  51	  “Distribution	  Automation,”	  National	  Electrical	  Manufacturers	  Association,	  October	  10,	  2014,	  accessed	  January	  25,	  2016,	  https://www.nema.org/Policy/After-­‐the-­‐Storm/Pages/Distribution-­‐Automation.aspx	  52	  “Reduce	  Costs,	  Calls	  and	  Foot	  Traffic	  with	  Real-­‐Time	  AMR	  Meter	  Reads,”	  Sensus,	  2015,	  accessed	  March	  2,	  2016,	  http://sensus.com/solutions/automatic-­‐meter-­‐reading-­‐amr/	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been	  completed	  with	  over	  40	  pilot	  projects	  being	  tested	  and	  many	  successful.	  For	  the	  Chinese	  environmental	  agencies,	  announcing	  a	  plan	  to	  do	  something	  and	  actually	  accomplishing	  it	  are	  usually	  mutually	  exclusive.	  This	  has	  been	  the	  result	  of	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  China’s	  plan,	  set	  for	  2011-­‐2015.	  The	  SGCC	  planned	  to	  fully	  construct	  the	  UHV	  grid	  and	  distribution	  grid,	  build	  the	  Smart	  Grid	  control	  and	  interactive	  service	  system,	  and	  	  have	  99.73%	  reliability	  rate	  in	  energy	  distributions.	  They	  also	  planned	  to	  have	  smart	  meters	  in	  widespread	  usage.	  Due	  to	  massive	  internal	  issues,	  the	  SGCC	  is	  currently	  three	  to	  ten	  years	  away	  from	  achieving	  each	  of	  their	  targets	  highlighted	  in	  phase	  two.	  Phase	  three,	  	  set	  for	  2016-­‐2020,	  aimed	  for	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  Smart	  Grid,	  with	  UHV	  transmission	  
Table	  1:	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capacity	  to	  reach	  400	  GW,	  and	  for	  China	  to	  become	  “world	  leaders	  in	  management,	  technology,	  and	  equipment.”	  53	  	   The	  plan’s	  second	  phase	  aimed	  to	  accelerate	  the	  construction	  of	  China’s	  ultra-­‐high	  voltage	  (UHV)	  lines,	  construct	  urban-­‐rural	  transmission	  networks,	  develop	  operational	  interactive	  control	  of	  the	  Smart	  Grid,	  and	  create	  necessary	  digital	  applications	  and	  equipment	  for	  ensured	  grid	  reliability.	  Though	  lagging	  significantly	  behind	  the	  2009	  plan,	  China’s	  public	  disclosure	  of	  their	  efforts	  have	  rung	  well	  in	  the	  Chinese	  market.	  	  Since	  Liu	  Zhenya,	  chairman	  of	  the	  SGCC,	  announced	  they	  would	  send	  excess	  renewable	  energy	  from	  China’s	  northwest	  regions	  to	  the	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  consumption	  centers	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  retiring	  hundreds	  of	  coal-­‐fired	  plants,	  investors	  have	  been	  bullish	  on	  energy	  infrastructure	  securities.	  54	  Amid	  a	  nine-­‐month	  long	  general	  Chinese	  company	  stock	  market	  drought,	  power	  grid	  equipment	  maker’s	  stocks	  have	  been	  increasing	  in	  2016.	  While	  this	  could	  certainly	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  positive	  reaction	  from	  the	  Chinese	  general	  public,	  perhaps	  it	  is	  on	  a	  larger	  scale	  due	  to	  an	  influx	  of	  investment	  by	  CCP	  officials	  to	  subsequently	  boost	  Chinese	  domestic	  confidence	  in	  the	  energy	  sector.	  	  	   In	  spite	  of	  stock	  investor’s	  enthusiasm	  of	  China’s	  UHV	  system,	  according	  to	  true	  measures	  of	  UHV	  construction,	  the	  CCP	  seems	  to	  be	  again	  successfully	  sugarcoating	  the	  truth	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  public	  favorability.	  In	  2009,	  SGCC	  leaders	  announced	  that	  they	  had	  “fully	  grasped	  the	  core	  technology”	  necessary	  to	  execute	  Ultra	  High	  Voltage	  energy	  distribution,	  and	  announced	  an	  initial	  funding	  amount	  of	  $92	  Billion	  to	  achieve	  full	  	  
                                                53	  “Electricity	  Transmission	  Systems,”	  World	  Nuclear,	  November	  2015,	  accessed	  February	  12,	  2016,	  http://www.world-­‐nuclear.org/information-­‐library/current-­‐and-­‐future-­‐generation/electricity-­‐transmission-­‐grids.aspx	  54	  “Ultra-­‐high	  voltage	  equipment	  makers	  set	  to	  benefit	  from	  China’s	  clean	  air	  push,”	  South	  China	  Morning	  Post,	  February	  16,	  2016,	  accessed	  February	  22,	  2016,	  http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1913439/ultra-­‐high-­‐voltage-­‐equipment-­‐makers-­‐set-­‐benefit-­‐chinas-­‐clean-­‐air-­‐push	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Figure	  4:	  
implementation	  by	  2020.	  Five	  years	  later,	  the	  SGCC	  laid	  out	  a	  seven-­‐year	  plan	  to	  construct	  37	  UHV	  lines	  by	  2020,	  covering	  over	  55,000	  miles	  (89,000	  km),	  in	  which	  11	  would	  be	  built	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2015;	  yet,	  only	  eight	  lines	  stretching	  a	  total	  distance	  of	  7,500	  miles	  (12,700	  km)	  had	  been	  built	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2015.55	  Hu	  Xinmin,	  senior	  manager	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  based	  economic	  consulting	  firm	  Lantau	  Group,	  hypothesized	  that	  “to	  meet	  this	  original	  2020	  target,	  China	  would	  need	  to	  more	  than	  double	  its	  UHV	  development	  effort,	  which	  seems	  unlikely	  given	  the	  challenges.”56	  As	  demonstrated	  in	  figure	  4,	  provided	  by	  the	  Lantau	  Group,	  at	  China’s	  current	  rate	  of	  construction,	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	  it	  will	  take	  about	  15-­‐20	  years	  longer	  than	  they	  had	  expected	  to	  reach	  their	  target	  of	  89,000	  km.	  When	  considering	  the	  number	  of	  companies	  that	  have	  contract	  plans	  to	  construct	  the	  equipment	  for	  the	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
                                                55	  “China’s	  under-­‐utilised	  ultra-­‐high-­‐voltage	  power	  lines	  no	  silver	  bullet	  to	  rid	  grid	  of	  bottlenecks,”	  South	  China	  Morning	  Post,	  February	  14,	  2016,	  accessed	  February	  24,	  2016,	  http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1912878/chinas-­‐under-­‐utilised-­‐ultra-­‐high-­‐voltage-­‐power-­‐lines-­‐no-­‐silver-­‐bullet-­‐rid	  56	  Ibid.	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transmission	  lines,	  they	  will	  be	  sorely	  disappointed	  when	  the	  projected	  schedule	  falls	  short	  of	  the	  actual	  schedule.	  	  The	  sluggish	  construction	  progress	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  differing	  views	  between	  the	  NEA	  and	  SGCC	  on	  the	  precise	  amounts	  of	  interconnection	  needed	  between	  each	  regional	  grid,	  how	  to	  curtail	  energy	  demand	  growth,	  and	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  system	  integration	  and	  delays.	  GE	  China	  Wind’s	  financial	  manager,	  Florence	  Xu,	  agreed	  with	  this	  analysis	  and	  added	  that	  the	  NEA’s	  views	  diverge	  with	  the	  SGCC’s	  chiefly	  in	  their	  preference	  to	  strengthen	  regional	  grids	  at	  this	  stage,	  as	  opposed	  to	  inter-­‐connecting	  regional	  grids.	  This	  organizational	  dispute	  brings	  to	  the	  surface	  a	  principal	  inherent	  characteristic	  of	  the	  Chinese	  economy.	  China’s	  intention	  to	  be	  the	  first	  nation	  with	  the	  plan	  to	  utilize	  UHV	  lines	  as	  the	  “heart”	  of	  its	  regional	  power	  grid	  network	  interconnection	  is	  hogwash.	  There	  is	  a	  reason	  that	  China	  is	  the	  first	  to	  do	  this,	  and	  in	  my	  opinion	  it	  does	  not	  yield	  them	  a	  long-­‐term	  beneficial	  outcome	  of	  any	  form.	  With	  regard	  to	  their	  energy	  infrastructure,	  China	  seems	  to	  think	  short-­‐term	  actions	  will	  result	  in	  a	  better	  reputation	  and	  stable	  results.	  Instead,	  China	  is	  once	  again	  moving	  backwards.	  By	  putting	  their	  focus	  on	  developing	  UHV	  lines	  first,	  China	  is	  committing	  the	  same	  mistake	  they	  have	  made	  when	  they	  began	  erecting	  wind	  turbines	  without	  readily	  available	  means	  of	  connecting	  them.	  	  	  A	  smarter	  approach	  for	  the	  CCP,	  NEA	  and	  grid	  operators	  would	  be	  to	  assemble	  the	  Chinese	  energy	  system	  from	  the	  ground	  up.	  This	  means	  no	  more	  sugarcoating	  or	  working	  backwards.	  If	  China	  wants	  to	  achieve	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  renewable	  economy	  operated	  through	  Smart	  Grid	  technology,	  they	  must	  first	  begin	  by	  restoring	  each	  of	  China’s	  six	  regional	  grid	  systems.	  The	  Smart	  grid	  system	  is	  efficient	  and	  necessary,	  but	  as	  the	  image	  3	  demonstrates,	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each	  regional	  system	  must	  first	  be	  strong	  before	  any	  excess	  energy	  from	  that	  system	  is	  transported	  via	  UHV	  lines	  to	  distant	  load	  centers.	  The	  whole	  is	  only	  as	  good	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  parts	  and	  thus,	  put	  simply,	  the	  CCP	  and	  SGCC	  ought	  to	  begin	  complying	  with	  the	  NEA.	  If	  they	  don’t,	  the	  bottlenecks	  will	  never	  leave	  the	  system	  and	  wind	  farm	  operators	  hopes	  that	  constructed	  UHV	  lines	  would	  relieve	  their	  distribution	  issues	  will	  be	  sorely	  disappointed.	  	  In	  fact,	  as	  of	  2016,	  China’s	  UHV	  lines	  are	  already	  facing	  substantial	  difficulties.	  The	  utilization	  and	  efficiency	  of	  their	  multi-­‐billion	  dollar	  long-­‐distance	  transmission	  lines	  have	  been	  considerably	  lower	  than	  expected.	  The	  Lantau	  Group	  senior	  manager	  reported	  in	  February	  that	  “utilization	  of	  the	  UHV	  lines	  remains	  below	  expectations	  due	  to	  many	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  performance	  of	  connected	  generation	  plants…	  [and]	  constraints	  in	  the	  local	  power	  grids.”57	  Additionally,	  figures	  from	  the	  SGCC	  state	  that	  the	  first	  three	  UHV	  lines	  had	  a	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  accessed	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capacity	  utilization	  of	  between	  only	  21%	  and	  56%	  in	  2014.58	  A	  typical	  first-­‐rate	  system	  would	  feature	  capacity	  utilization	  between	  80%	  and	  95%.	  These	  UHV	  lines	  were	  designed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  handle	  about	  9	  GW	  of	  transmission	  capacity,	  but	  meanwhile	  they	  have	  been	  transmitting	  far	  less	  than	  that.	  What	  we	  are	  seeing	  here	  is	  that	  China’s	  regional	  grids	  are	  incapable	  of	  efficient	  outbound	  and	  inbound	  power	  transmission.	  The	  claim	  on	  the	  poor	  condition	  of	  the	  network	  is	  bolstered	  by	  testimony	  from	  Dennis	  Ip,	  head	  of	  utilities	  and	  renewables	  research	  at	  reporting	  agency	  Daiwa	  Capital	  Markets,	  who	  disclosed	  that	  this	  year	  the	  UHV	  line	  linking	  the	  Xinjiang	  and	  Henan	  provinces	  suffered	  its	  lowest	  utilization	  because,	  due	  to	  damage	  inflicted	  by	  huge	  load	  fluctuations,	  it	  was	  under	  maintenance	  for	  six	  months	  in	  2015.	  To	  reiterate,	  a	  stronger	  regional	  grid	  would	  be	  capable	  of	  handling	  such	  fluctuations	  and	  electricity	  transmission.	  	  The	  final	  aspect	  of	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  the	  Smart	  Grid	  deployment	  involves	  the	  installation	  of	  a	  smart	  meters	  on	  every	  Chinese	  household.	  Included	  as	  part	  of	  the	  pilot	  process,	  the	  State	  Grid	  has	  set	  an	  ambitious	  goal	  to	  have	  each	  home	  monitored	  by	  a	  Smart	  home	  meter	  individually	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2017.	  The	  NDRC	  stressed	  that	  these	  meters	  will	  be	  crucial	  to	  ensure	  a	  stable	  pricing	  system	  for	  electricity.	  Also	  known	  as	  time-­‐of-­‐use	  pricing,	  step	  pricing	  will	  help	  the	  Smart	  Grid	  to	  better	  digitally	  monitor	  energy	  supply	  and	  demand,	  allowing	  the	  system	  to	  move	  the	  peak	  to	  fill	  the	  valley.	  In	  other	  words,	  energy	  shortages	  due	  a	  lack	  of	  infrastructural	  capabilities,	  which	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  struggle	  for	  the	  load	  center	  congested	  cities	  of	  the	  East,	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  an	  issue.	  	  While	  China	  has	  to	  date	  installed	  smart	  meter	  technology	  in	  roughly	  25%	  of	  nationwide	  homes	  and	  businesses,	  at	  this	  rate	  it	  seems	  unrealistic	  that	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	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finish	  installment	  by	  2018.	  A	  drawback	  for	  China’s	  smart	  meter	  system	  is	  its	  limitations	  in	  functionality.	  With	  400	  million	  potential	  smart	  meter	  users,	  China’s	  market	  is	  significantly	  larger	  than	  others.	  The	  United	  States,	  for	  example,	  has	  targeted	  a	  price	  per	  meter	  at	  between	  $100	  and	  $150,	  which	  will	  include	  significant	  computing	  power	  and	  communications	  capability.59	  Due	  to	  the	  large	  Chinese	  market,	  they	  have	  targeted	  a	  much	  lower	  price	  per	  meter	  of	  $50,	  equipping	  the	  systems	  with	  lower	  quality	  and	  efficiency	  meters.	  China	  is	  valuing	  quantity	  over	  quality,	  which	  will	  lead	  to	  unfavorable	  outcomes	  when	  the	  smart	  meters	  face	  operational	  limitations	  when	  applied	  to	  the	  Smart	  Grid.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  much	  of	  China’s	  smart	  meter	  system,	  even	  after	  full	  potential	  installment	  by	  2018,	  will	  lack	  full	  functionality.	  This	  is	  because	  China	  has	  chosen	  to	  separate	  the	  communications	  and	  metering	  components	  in	  its	  smart	  meters.	  As	  a	  result,	  these	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  meters	  will	  likely	  not	  be	  technologically	  supported	  by	  the	  outdated	  network	  monitoring	  technology.	  In	  a	  sense,	  China	  is	  shooting	  itself	  in	  the	  foot	  by	  building	  backwards	  here.	  And	  this	  is	  not	  the	  first	  time	  they’ve	  done	  so;	  one	  must	  not	  forget	  China’s	  building	  of	  wind	  turbines	  before	  the	  grid	  to	  support	  them	  or	  their	  expensive	  construction	  of	  UHV	  lines	  before	  ensuring	  stronger	  regional	  grids.	  Rather	  than	  designing	  a	  network	  digital	  system	  to	  monitor	  and	  report	  on	  the	  Smart	  Grid	  first,	  China	  has	  begun	  constructing	  auxiliary	  system	  components,	  which	  subsequently	  will	  incur	  unforeseen	  monetary	  and	  time	  management	  costs.	  It	  seems	  that	  China’s	  investments	  are	  not	  conducted	  with	  the	  full	  intention	  of	  environmental	  and	  economic	  development,	  but	  more	  so	  to	  inflate	  intentional	  reputation.	  To	  clarify,	  because	  of	  the	  potential	  damage	  from	  mismatches,	  China	  risks	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actually	  increasing	  the	  costs	  and	  failure	  rates,	  which	  in	  turn	  will	  likely	  have	  a	  positive	  feedback	  loop.	  	  China’s	  Smart	  Grid	  construction	  progress	  is	  trailing	  the	  State	  Grid’s	  plan	  by	  at	  least	  five	  years.	  China	  may	  be	  facing	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword	  here	  because	  while	  the	  development	  of	  a	  Smart	  Grid	  would	  be	  hugely	  beneficial,	  it	  will	  be	  monumentally	  costly	  for	  the	  environment	  and	  economy.	  Each	  year	  China	  goes	  without	  an	  efficient	  grid	  results	  in	  8	  billion	  metric	  tons	  of	  carbon	  emissions	  released	  in	  the	  atmosphere,	  a	  value	  which	  equals	  the	  annual	  emissions	  of	  Russia,	  India,	  and	  the	  USA	  cumulatively.60	  Moreover,	  because	  at	  least	  half	  of	  China’s	  wind	  turbines	  are	  still	  sitting	  idle,	  China	  loses	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  $2	  Billion	  annually.	  The	  causes	  of	  China’s	  struggling	  energy	  grid	  development	  can	  be	  pinpointed	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  efficient	  organization	  by	  the	  CCP.	  In	  other	  words,	  many	  credible	  sources	  lament	  China’s	  decisions	  to	  mask	  the	  truth	  of	  their	  progress,	  and	  ultimately	  such	  sources	  feel	  China	  would	  benefit	  most	  from	  focusing	  first	  on	  a	  strengthening	  of	  the	  regional	  grids,	  then	  producing	  UHV	  lines	  and	  Smart	  technology,	  and	  lastly	  production	  and	  connection	  of	  wind	  turbine	  generators.	  If	  the	  regional	  grids	  remain	  weak,	  the	  entire	  Smart	  Grid	  will	  rest	  on	  an	  unsteady	  foundation.	  With	  the	  information	  in	  this	  paper,	  and	  disclosure	  from	  other	  sources,	  hopefully	  China	  will	  recognize	  that	  whitewashing	  the	  energy	  sector	  is	  perhaps	  the	  least	  efficient	  strategy	  to	  developing	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  renewable	  based	  economy.	  One	  thing	  is	  for	  sure;	  any	  more	  time	  that	  the	  CCP	  and	  SGCC	  spend	  away	  from	  the	  regional	  grids	  will	  increase	  costs	  for	  what	  is	  already	  becoming	  an	  unaffordable	  venture.	  While	  it	  may	  be	  a	  large	  leap,	  it	  seems	  in	  many	  ways	  that	  China	  has	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actually	  retreated	  to	  its	  long-­‐term	  monocultural	  approach	  with	  heavy	  control	  from	  the	  center,	  when	  instead	  an	  intelligent	  central	  plan	  would	  require	  giving	  up	  some	  power	  to	  the	  regions.	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Chapter	  6:	  Economic	  &	  Social	  Costs	  of	  China’s	  Wind	  Power	  and	  Smart	  Grid:	  	  	   China	  has	  incurred	  financial	  costs	  from	  their	  wind	  power	  systems	  and	  Smart	  Grid	  of	  well	  over	  $200	  billion	  since	  2000.	  In	  addition,	  China’s	  transition	  from	  a	  coal-­‐based	  economy	  to	  a	  renewable	  based	  economy	  has	  led	  to	  sizable	  environmental	  and	  diplomatic	  costs.	  While	  assessing	  the	  comprehensive	  economic	  costs	  of	  China’s	  wind	  program	  and	  Smart	  Grid	  is	  unrealistic	  due	  to	  CCP	  controllership	  and	  the	  utter	  scope	  of	  such	  operations,	  this	  chapter	  will	  use	  a	  combination	  of	  analytical	  reports	  and	  industry	  standard	  costs	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  on	  the	  economic	  feasibility	  and	  social	  outcomes	  of	  China’s	  energy	  sector.	  Although	  this	  chapter	  highlights	  the	  economic	  advantages	  of	  wind	  power	  and	  grid	  installation,	  it	  will	  bring	  to	  light	  the	  major	  costs	  China	  will	  incur	  if	  such	  systems	  are	  not	  built	  efficiently.	  Though	  cost	  analytics	  can	  be	  very	  intricate,	  here	  we	  will	  be	  using	  a	  simplified	  approach	  using	  three	  cost	  indicators:	  equipment	  costs,	  total	  installed	  project	  costs,	  and	  the	  levelized	  cost	  of	  electricity	  generation	  (LCOE).	  An	  important	  note	  to	  consider	  is	  that	  the	  analyses	  used	  contain	  price	  indicators.	  Thus,	  costs	  and	  prices	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  level	  above	  or	  below	  the	  normal	  profit	  seen	  in	  a	  competitive	  market.	  Because	  the	  transition	  into	  a	  renewable-­‐based	  energy	  sector	  is	  rarely	  well-­‐balanced,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  China’s	  issues,	  the	  short-­‐term	  can	  see	  prices	  increase	  well	  above	  costs	  if	  supply	  cannot	  meet	  demand	  (and	  vice	  versa).	  Before	  delving	  into	  a	  discounted	  cash	  flow	  analysis	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  LCOE	  of	  China’s	  wind	  platform,	  I	  will	  first	  lay	  out	  the	  breakdown	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  wind	  power.	  While	  wind	  is	  a	  capital	  intensive	  energy	  source,	  like	  other	  renewable	  energy	  sources,	  it	  differs	  in	  that	  its	  fuel	  is	  free.	  Investment	  costs,	  operation	  and	  maintenance	  costs	  (O&M),	  capacity	  factor,	  economic	  lifetime,	  and	  cost	  of	  capital	  are	  the	  most	  important	  parameters	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for	  analyzing	  wind	  power	  economics.61	  Unlike	  other	  capital	  intensive	  renewable	  sources,	  wind	  is	  among	  the	  most	  cost-­‐efficient	  with	  regard	  to	  dollar	  cost	  per	  KwH	  produced.	  But,	  as	  seen	  in	  my	  analysis,	  often	  not	  all	  of	  that	  dollar	  cost	  per	  is	  delivered.	  	  The	  capital	  costs	  of	  a	  wind	  project	  should	  be	  divided	  into	  these	  major	  categories:	  the	  turbine	  costs,	  civil	  works,	  grid	  connection	  costs,	  and	  other	  capital	  costs.	  Turbine	  costs	  include	  blades,	  tower	  and	  transformers,	  while	  civil	  works	  include	  site	  preparation	  and	  tower	  foundation	  costs.	  Grid	  connection	  costs	  can	  include	  both	  the	  transformers	  and	  substations	  as	  well	  as	  the	  connection	  to	  the	  transmission	  or	  distribution	  grid.	  Other	  capital	  costs	  can	  include	  building	  construction,	  control	  systems	  etc.	  Figure	  5	  demonstrates	  the	  capital	  cost	  breakdown	  for	  a	  Chinese	  onshore	  wind	  system	  and	  turbine.	  As	  one	  can	  see,	  almost	  the	  entire	  cost	  of	  the	  wind	  turbine	  is	  upfront.	  This	  leaves	  only	  future	  maintenance	  and	  financing	  options	  going	  forward.	  For	  China,	  it	  has	  been	  a	  strategic	  move	  to	  build	  wind	  	  	  
                                                61	  “Renewable	  Energy	  Technologies:	  Cost	  Analysis	  Series,”	  International	  Renewable	  Energy	  Agency,	  June	  2012	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turbines	  now,	  ensuring	  a	  cleaner	  and	  more	  cost-­‐effective	  future.	  However,	  as	  figure	  5	  and	  statistics	  exhibit,	  11%	  of	  the	  turbine	  cost	  has	  not	  been	  carried	  out	  on	  an	  estimated	  30%	  to	  40%	  of	  China’s	  wind	  fleet.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  by	  financing	  89%	  of	  the	  turbines	  first,	  China’s	  grid	  corporations	  could	  end	  up	  paying	  more	  than	  11%	  per	  turbine	  if	  they	  continue	  to	  struggle	  with	  grid	  curtailment	  and	  network	  transmission.	  	  While	  the	  total	  installed	  capital	  costs	  for	  an	  average	  Chinese	  wind	  turbine	  in	  2014	  ranged	  between	  $1300	  and	  $1450	  per	  KwH,	  a	  US	  turbine	  faced	  capital	  investment	  costs	  of	  between	  $2000	  and	  $2500	  per	  KwH.	  The	  United	  States	  actually	  faced	  a	  price	  hike	  from	  2012	  through	  2015	  because	  market	  demand	  exponentially	  increased	  and	  the	  global	  supply	  chain	  had	  difficulty	  delivering.	  This	  caused	  significant	  shortages	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  thus	  a	  price	  hike,	  but	  such	  price	  variation	  was	  not	  experienced	  in	  China	  because	  the	  CCP	  controls	  the	  entire	  wind	  turbine	  market	  through	  its	  two	  major	  utility	  companies,	  SGCC	  and	  CSPG.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  approximate	  3,700	  U.S.	  utilities	  are	  regulated	  at	  the	  state	  level.62	  For	  this	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  George	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reason,	  they	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  other	  countries	  for	  supply	  nor	  demand,	  and	  therefore	  transportation	  costs	  and	  equipment	  costs	  are	  typically	  stagnant.	  	  Figure	  6,	  released	  by	  the	  IEA	  in	  2011,	  demonstrates	  China’s	  significant	  cost	  advantages	  in	  wind	  as	  compared	  to	  other	  major	  wind-­‐friendly	  nations.	  The	  figure’s	  teal	  bars	  represent	  2008	  prices	  per	  KwH	  while	  the	  light	  brown	  bar	  shows	  2010	  prices	  per	  KwH,	  all	  for	  a	  1.5	  MW-­‐sized	  wind	  turbine.	  China’s	  price	  of	  a	  turbine	  was	  only	  $700	  per	  KwH	  in	  2010,	  and	  has	  since	  decreased	  to	  $500	  per	  KwH	  in	  2012.63	  Thus,	  both	  total	  installed	  costs	  and	  manufacturing	  costs	  per	  turbine	  summed	  to	  between	  about	  $1900	  for	  a	  Chinese	  turbine	  versus	  upwards	  of	  $3500	  for	  a	  US	  turbine.	  This	  gives	  China	  an	  absolute	  advantage	  in	  the	  production	  of	  wind	  power	  because	  they’re	  able	  to	  produce	  it	  at	  a	  lower	  cost	  than	  any	  other	  nation.	  	  Playing	  a	  major	  role	  in	  China’s	  absolute	  advantage	  is	  the	  government	  structure	  which	  allows	  for	  ease	  of	  production	  and	  financing	  to	  the	  wind	  sector.	  Nathaniel	  Bullard,	  clean	  energy	  and	  China	  analyst	  for	  Bloomberg	  New	  Energy	  Finance,	  supported	  this	  by	  explaining	  “China	  has	  very	  strong	  renewable	  energy	  targets	  for	  wind.	  The	  countries	  that	  really	  attract	  large	  private	  finance	  or	  have	  high	  growth	  investment	  are	  the	  ones	  with	  stable	  energy	  policies.”	  Bullard’s	  point	  is	  valid,	  though	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  in	  2013,	  of	  the	  $923	  million	  worth	  of	  wind	  energy	  goods	  and	  services	  traded	  between	  the	  USA	  and	  China,	  the	  USA	  held	  a	  net	  trade	  surplus	  of	  roughly	  $150	  million.64	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  two	  lights.	  First,	  the	  US	  still	  has	  a	  strong	  hold	  on	  the	  renewables	  sector	  and	  China	  values	  American	  made	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energy	  sector	  goods	  more	  than	  the	  USA	  values	  Chinese-­‐made	  energy	  goods.	  Or	  second,	  China	  is	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  domestic	  future	  of	  their	  wind	  programs,	  and	  therefore	  only	  imports	  US	  products	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  in	  its	  technology	  and	  manufacturing	  services.	  The	  differences	  in	  the	  success	  of	  these	  nation’s	  wind	  programs	  ultimately	  lies	  on	  their	  government’s	  policies.	  Ren	  Dongming,	  deputy	  director	  for	  the	  center	  for	  the	  NDRC,	  noted	  that	  “policy	  choices	  will	  determine	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  clean	  energy	  industry	  in	  the	  months	  and	  years	  ahead.”65	  Notwithstanding,	  while	  the	  prices	  of	  Chinese	  equipment	  are	  much	  lower	  than	  those	  of	  other	  nations,	  the	  quality	  of	  Chinese	  energy	  infrastructure	  technology	  and	  turbine	  equipment	  systems	  is	  inferior	  to	  those	  of	  competitors.	  This	  leaves	  the	  door	  open	  for	  non-­‐Chinese	  companies	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  metering	  boom.	  International	  powerhouses	  in	  the	  energy	  market,	  such	  as	  Siemens	  and	  General	  Electric,	  have	  their	  eyes	  on	  China’s	  energy	  market	  technology	  weaknesses	  as	  a	  prospective	  way	  into	  the	  market.	  	  In	  a	  conversation	  with	  a	  GE	  China	  Renewables	  Wind	  financial	  manager,	  Florence	  Xu,	  she	  made	  two	  points	  to	  me	  regarding	  GE’s	  penetration	  into	  the	  Chinese	  market.	  First,	  since	  China’s	  energy	  market	  is	  primarily	  state	  owned,	  GE	  Wind	  as	  of	  2016	  only	  controls	  about	  3%	  of	  China’s	  market	  share.	  Although	  wind	  industry	  top-­‐three	  manufacturers	  GE,	  Vestas,	  and	  Siemens	  produce	  superior	  quality	  and	  efficiency	  products,	  the	  CCP,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  protect	  their	  self-­‐owned	  domestic	  producers,	  feels	  that	  the	  costs	  of	  allowing	  international	  market	  penetration	  outweigh	  the	  benefits	  of	  superior	  efficiency	  wind	  generation.	  In	  fact,	  the	  CCP	  takes	  domestic	  production	  so	  seriously	  that	  their	  state-­‐run	  producers	  typically	  will	  work	  with	  China’s	  low-­‐cost	  vendors	  so	  as	  to	  obtain	  massive	  internal	  economies	  of	  scale	  for	  
                                                65	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both	  those	  firms	  and	  the	  China’s	  SOEs.	  Such	  a	  strategy	  causes	  future	  suppliers	  to	  the	  Chinese	  wind	  market	  to	  face	  scant	  profit	  margins.	  	  Second,	  Florence	  notes	  that	  as	  generation	  capacity	  grows	  bigger	  and	  bigger,	  cost	  must	  be	  driven	  lower	  and	  lower	  in	  order	  for	  GE	  to	  maintain	  their	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  production	  process.	  However,	  channeling	  back	  to	  chapter	  4	  with	  the	  explanation	  of	  China’s	  energy	  policies,	  Ren	  Dongming’s	  analysis	  is	  supported	  by	  a	  2015	  study	  by	  Liu	  et	  al.	  which	  uses	  a	  LCOE	  model	  to	  investigate	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  2009	  FIT,	  and	  other	  attractive	  public	  subsidies,	  on	  China’s	  wind	  program.	  While	  several	  in-­‐place	  wind	  policies	  have	  been	  instrumental	  in	  causing	  a	  positive	  increase	  in	  domestic	  production	  and	  capacity	  installation	  of	  wind,	  the	  CCP	  and	  SGCC’s	  focus	  on	  boosting	  installed	  capacity	  in	  place	  of	  power	  generation,	  their	  attention	  to	  production	  scale	  rather	  than	  quality	  of	  a	  wind	  turbine,	  and	  lastly	  their	  decision	  to	  focus	  on	  economic	  growth	  by	  industry	  policy	  instead	  of	  environmental	  policy	  to	  promote	  renewable	  (especially	  wind)	  generation	  has	  been	  disconcerting	  to	  the	  energy	  sector	  as	  well	  as	  the	  general	  public.	  Notwithstanding,	  the	  2015	  study	  using	  analytical	  framework	  for	  the	  LCOE	  has	  brought	  forth	  opposing	  evidence	  regarding	  China’s	  success.	  Yet,	  before	  delving	  into	  the	  study’s	  results,	  one	  must	  understand	  the	  levelized	  cost	  of	  energy	  model	  and	  why	  it's	  most	  often	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  economic	  practicality	  of	  renewable	  power	  generation.	  For	  a	  wind	  project,	  the	  LCOE	  constitutes	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  costs	  of	  a	  functional	  wind	  power	  system	  over	  the	  entire	  life	  of	  the	  project,	  with	  financial	  flows	  discounted	  to	  a	  common	  year.	  As	  image	  4	  demonstrates,	  the	  main	  elements	  that	  make	  up	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Image	  4:	  
the	  LCOE	  for	  wind	  power	  includes	  costs	  of	  capital,	  O&M	  costs,	  and	  the	  projected	  yearly	  electricity	  production	  amount.66	  	  This	  model	  employs	  techniques	  from	  the	  E3	  model	  which	  essentially	  measures	  the	  value	  of	  wind	  power	  through	  a	  representation	  of	  generator’s	  cash	  flows	  including	  technology	  and	  fuel,	  O&M,	  emissions	  control	  and	  cost,	  as	  well	  as	  incurred	  taxes	  from	  pollutants.	  This	  model	  is	  used	  to	  evaluate	  the	  Chinese	  energy	  market	  for	  coal	  and	  other	  fossil-­‐fuel	  generation	  systems.	  This	  is	  useful	  because	  it	  allows	  comparisons	  between	  the	  economic	  feasibility	  of	  wind	  versus	  coal	  in	  China.	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  Series,”	  International	  Renewable	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  Agency,	  June	  2012	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   All	  costs	  and	  revenues	  in	  the	  future	  are	  accounted	  for	  in	  the	  model	  by	  using	  the	  present	  time	  value	  of	  money.	  Utilizing	  a	  discounted	  cash	  flow	  analysis,	  where	  r	  equals	  the	  discount	  rate,	  the	  LCOE	  is	  most	  accurately	  measured	  when	  the	  present	  value	  of	  the	  discounted	  revenues	  sum	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  discounted	  value	  of	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  costs	  during	  the	  entire	  economic	  lifetime	  of	  the	  wind	  system	  (measured	  in	  N	  years):67	  
Next	  the	  net	  present	  value	  (NPV)	  is	  set	  equal	  to	  zero.	  Here,	  the	  LCOE	  is	  the	  mean	  energy	  price	  necessary	  for	  a	  NPV	  equal	  to	  zero,	  resulting	  in	  an	  investor	  return	  proportionate	  to	  the	  investment’s	  discount	  rate,	  r.	  Accordingly,	  the	  total	  of	  the	  present	  values	  of	  LCOEn	  multiplied	  by	  the	  electricity	  produced	  yearly,	  En,	  will	  equal	  the	  total	  of	  the	  present	  values	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  project.	  But	  after	  division,	  the	  LCOE	  will	  equal	  the	  sum	  of	  discounted	  costs	  over	  the	  project’s	  life	  divided	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  discounted	  energy	  generated.	  Following	  this	  final	  calculation,	  the	  initial	  cost	  for	  the	  lifetime	  of	  the	  project	  is	  annualized	  below:	  
The	  above	  equation	  demonstrates	  that	  LCOEs	  costs	  can	  be	  broken	  down	  further	  into	  CAPEXn	  as	  the	  the	  yearly	  value	  of	  the	  initial	  capital	  expenditure;	  OPEXn	  as	  the	  yearly	  operation	  expenditure;	  TAXn	  for	  the	  annual	  tax;	  C	  for	  the	  installed	  capacity	  measure;	  H	  being	  the	  annual	  usage	  hours;	  ou	  as	  the	  operational	  usage	  rate;	  N	  as	  the	  service	  life	  of	  the	  plant;	  finally,	  r	  as	  the	  discount	  rate.	  
                                                67	  “Renewable	  Energy	  Technologies:	  Cost	  Analysis	  Series,”	  International	  Renewable	  Energy	  Agency,	  June	  2012	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   With	  the	  E3	  DCF	  model	  empirically	  explained	  above,	  it	  is	  now	  appropriate	  to	  observe	  the	  findings	  of	  Liu,	  Zhang,	  Zhao,	  and	  Yuan’s	  analysis	  and	  determine	  what	  the	  outcomes	  of	  China’s	  FIT	  wind	  subsidy	  have	  been	  on	  recent	  wind	  production	  costs	  and	  overall	  system	  development.	  The	  study’s	  results,	  exhibited	  in	  table	  2,	  present	  five	  numerical	  scenarios	  for	  a	  typical	  wind	  farm	  in	  2009	  and	  2013	  with	  year	  to	  year	  decreasing	  unit	  investment,	  variable	  annual	  operation	  hours,	  and	  alternating	  service	  life,	  depreciation,	  and	  maintenance	  rate.	  	  Table	  2	  reveals	  that	  a	  2009	  wind	  farm	  in	  the	  category	  I	  zone,	  consisting	  of	  the	  Inner	  Mongolia	  region,	  with	  only	  1900	  operation	  hours	  and	  a	  lessened	  service	  life	  of	  15	  years,	  on	  top	  of	  an	  unusually	  high	  maintenance	  rate	  of	  4%,	  results	  in	  a	  LCOE	  of	  ¥0.73	  per	  KwH.	  Because	  the	  category	  I	  region	  has	  a	  government	  mandated	  FIT	  of	  ¥0.51	  per	  KwH,	  this	  wind	  farm	  is	  technically	  posting	  a	  net	  loss	  because	  the	  LCOE	  is	  well	  above	  the	  FIT.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  observing	  the	  same	  situation	  but	  for	  2013,	  one	  can	  see	  that	  the	  LCOE	  is	  only	  ¥0.48	  per	  KwH,	  which	  bolsters	  the	  FIT’s	  principal	  goal	  that	  decreasing	  capital	  expenditure,	  despite	  serious	  grid	  curtailment	  issues,	  can	  still	  lead	  to	  posted	  profitable	  returns.	  	  Because	  China’s	  wind	  FIT	  amount	  is	  determined	  based	  upon	  the	  desulfurized	  coal	  power	  price	  plus	  a	  specific	  subsidy,	  which	  is	  essentially	  the	  real	  value	  of	  cleaned-­‐up	  coal,	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the	  value	  is	  included	  on	  the	  bottom	  row	  of	  table	  2.	  In	  order	  to	  allow	  for	  comparative	  analysis,	  each	  of	  the	  power	  prices	  displayed	  is	  the	  true	  price	  calculated	  for	  coal	  plants	  located	  in	  the	  same	  wind	  resource	  region	  as	  the	  numerical	  wind	  data	  above.	  One	  can	  observe	  in	  all	  five	  scenarios	  in	  2009,	  the	  wind	  power	  LCOE	  with	  the	  subsidy	  for	  the	  FIT	  still	  exceeds	  the	  coal	  power	  price	  from	  ¥0.2	  per	  KwH	  through	  ¥0.06	  KwH.68	  Because	  producers	  will	  rationally	  choose	  the	  lower	  cost	  mechanism,	  this	  exact	  cost	  divergence	  has	  been	  China’s	  biggest	  struggle	  in	  attempting	  to	  transition	  to	  renewable	  energy	  systems.	  Yet,	  as	  can	  be	  observed	  by	  observing	  the	  2013,	  2015,	  and	  2020	  numbers	  (in	  both	  tables	  2	  and	  3),	  the	  days	  of	  coal	  being	  dollars	  cheaper	  than	  renewable	  energy	  are	  over.	  As	  demonstrated	  earlier	  in	  figure	  3,	  China’s	  absolute	  cost	  advantage	  in	  production	  of	  wind	  turbines	  coupled	  with	  the	  industry’s	  FIT	  have	  resulted	  in	  LCOEs	  of	  wind	  power	  which	  are	  either	  nearing	  or	  considerably	  less	  than	  coal	  power	  prices.	  Table	  3	  contains	  predictions	  of	  LCOEs	  in	  2015	  and	  2020	  using	  a	  reduced	  learning-­‐by-­‐doing	  rate	  from	  6%	  to	  only	  4%,	  and	  highlights	  that	  capital	  investment	  amounts	  will	  likely	  no	  longer	  play	  a	  chief	  role	  in	  calculating	  LCOEs	  going	  forward,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  length	  of	  service	  life,	  number	  of	  annual	  operation	  hours,	  and	  the	  percentage	  of	  maintenance	  costs	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  significant	  factors.	  	  	  
                                                68	  “China’s	  2016	  FIT	  Rates	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  than	  Expectation,	  Energy	  Trend	  of	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  Corp.,	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  accessed	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  2016,	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The	  important	  takeaway	  is	  that	  even	  though	  wind	  power	  has	  always	  been	  cleaner	  and	  healthier	  than	  coal-­‐fired	  power,	  it	  is	  now	  cost	  competitive	  with	  coal.	  This	  is	  the	  fundamental	  reason	  that	  China	  is	  switching	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  renewable	  based	  energy	  program.	  	   The	  study	  presents	  supporting	  evidence	  for	  the	  successful	  progress	  to	  date	  of	  China’s	  FIT	  policy.	  It	  displays	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  FIT	  which	  effectively	  triggers	  wind	  power	  capital	  investment,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  CCP’s	  industrial	  policy	  which	  stimulates	  	  wind	  turbine	  manufacturing	  domestically,	  and	  finally	  the	  mutual	  benefit	  of	  the	  integration	  between	  technological	  advancements	  and	  capacity	  installation.	  Each	  of	  the	  above	  developmental	  elements	  have	  worked	  cohesively	  to	  diminish	  China’s	  LCOE	  to	  the	  point	  where	  wind,	  a	  free	  low-­‐carbon	  clean	  energy	  fuel,	  has	  become	  a	  cost-­‐competitive	  energy	  market	  option	  alongside	  coal	  power.	  With	  regard	  to	  this	  paper’s	  contention	  that	  grid	  curtailment	  and	  integration	  represent	  China’s	  greatest	  bottlenecks	  to	  wind	  energy	  success,	  the	  results	  of	  this	  study	  support	  my	  analysis	  by	  highlighting	  the	  importance	  of	  such	  issues	  in	  long-­‐run	  sustainable	  development	  of	  wind	  generation,	  but	  expand	  on	  it	  by	  proposing	  that,	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  wind	  farm	  development,	  both	  technological	  learning	  and	  cost	  reduction	  are	  of	  utmost	  priority.69	  In	  using	  both	  Morthorst’s	  1999	  report,	  which	  highlighted	  the	  significance	  of	  measuring	  efficiency	  and	  administrative	  demands	  to	  evaluate	  wind	  power	  growth,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  2013	  paper	  by	  Hu	  et	  al.,	  which	  conveys	  that	  technology	  and	  administration	  are	  the	  two	  most	  important	  indicators	  of	  wind	  progress,	  one	  can	  conclude	  wind	  power	  policy	  has,	  until	  2013,	  been	  instrumental	  in	  the	  substantial	  
                                                69	  Hu,	  Wang,	  Byrne,	  Kurdgelashvili,	  “Review	  of	  wind	  power	  tariff	  policies	  in	  China,”	  University	  of	  Delaware,	  August	  21,	  2012,	  accessed	  January	  14,	  2016,	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decreasing	  of	  the	  LCOE	  for	  wind.70	  This	  therefore	  indicates	  the	  clear	  presence	  of	  economies	  of	  scale.	  The	  above	  DCF	  framework	  for	  LCOE	  brings	  to	  light	  how	  crucial	  it	  is	  for	  the	  CCP	  and	  NEA	  to	  work	  cohesively	  so	  as	  to	  enact	  brand	  new	  protocols	  which	  will	  ensure	  a	  sustainable	  future	  for	  China’s	  wind	  program.	  Because	  the	  contemporary	  wind	  power	  subsidy	  is	  funded	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  CCP’s	  internal	  endowment	  and	  a	  surtax	  on	  the	  nationwide	  retail	  tariff	  for	  energy,	  such	  funding	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  potential	  annual	  budget	  cuts	  as	  well	  as	  Chinese	  energy	  consumer’s	  pockets.	  	  China’s	  surcharge	  on	  customer	  energy	  tariffs	  began	  with	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Renewable	  Energy	  Law	  in	  2006,	  a	  law	  which	  asserted	  the	  importance	  of	  promoting	  renewable	  energy	  system	  development	  in	  China.	  Though	  the	  surcharge	  began	  at	  ¥0.1	  per	  KwH,	  record	  breaking	  increases	  in	  installed	  capacity	  have	  driven	  the	  aggregate	  subsidy	  through	  the	  roof.	  The	  CCP	  augmented	  the	  surcharge	  three	  times	  until	  it	  reached	  ¥2	  per	  KwH,	  whereafter	  the	  government	  and	  energy	  sector	  realized	  the	  problem	  was	  getting	  out	  of	  hand.	  By	  2008,	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  subsidy	  supply	  and	  demand	  was	  ¥1.3	  billion	  and	  by	  2011,	  the	  gap	  had	  exceeded	  ¥10	  billion.71	  During	  the	  12th	  five-­‐year-­‐plan	  in	  late	  last	  year	  the	  gap	  had	  surpassed	  the	  	  ¥100	  billion	  mark.	  What	  is	  the	  CCP	  and	  Chinese	  energy	  sector	  to	  do;	  they	  can	  either	  decide	  to	  increase	  the	  surtax	  exponentially	  and	  face	  the	  wrath	  of	  revolted	  citizens,	  or	  they	  can	  maintain	  the	  level	  of	  the	  surcharge	  and	  gamble	  with	  the	  chances	  of	  a	  wind	  deployment	  downtrend.	  In	  other	  words,	  much	  of	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  economies	  of	  scale	  is	  actually	  a	  concealed	  increasingly	  larger	  subsidy.	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The	  fundamental	  idea	  of	  implementing	  an	  FIT	  is	  ultimately	  to	  lower	  the	  initial	  costs	  of	  wind	  development	  to	  competing	  costs	  with	  typically	  cheap	  fossil	  fuels.	  Sensibly,	  after	  a	  few	  years	  of	  government	  aid,	  the	  operational	  wind	  farm	  will	  have	  garnered	  sufficient	  scale	  and	  technologies,	  hence	  allowing	  for	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  FIT	  so	  that	  its	  funds	  can	  be	  allocated	  elsewhere.72	  In	  spite	  of	  such	  economic	  practicality,	  China	  has	  continued	  to	  supply	  FIT	  funds	  to	  wind	  farms	  for	  far	  more	  years	  than	  they	  are	  needed.	  Instead,	  the	  CCP	  should	  have	  confidence	  in	  its	  own	  economy	  and	  let	  the	  invisible	  hand	  of	  the	  market	  guide	  the	  success	  of	  developed	  wind	  turbine	  projects.	  If	  China	  continues	  to	  fund	  so	  carelessly,	  there	  will	  be	  several	  consequences,	  including	  numerous	  unknown	  costs.	  	  The	  first,	  and	  most	  obvious	  downside,	  would	  be	  China’s	  loss	  of	  support	  for	  renewable	  energy	  from	  its	  customers.	  This	  would	  once	  again	  be	  a	  blow	  to	  China’s	  international	  image.	  Despite	  the	  obvious	  benefits	  of	  renewable	  energy,	  fewer	  consumers	  will	  elect	  to	  support	  it	  if	  it	  means	  that	  tariffs,	  which	  will	  likely	  increase	  year-­‐to-­‐year,	  must	  be	  paid	  out	  of	  pocket	  annually.	  Furthermore,	  any	  allocated	  funding	  for	  other	  renewable	  energy	  systems,	  such	  as	  solar	  power,	  will	  be	  diminished.	  Finally,	  because	  the	  CCP	  subsidizes	  China’s	  wind	  industry,	  hence	  deeming	  wind	  a	  public	  good,	  if	  its	  subsidy	  is	  being	  used	  inefficiently,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  a	  waste	  of	  government	  financial	  funding	  but	  is	  further	  a	  waste	  of	  a	  public	  good.	  A	  relatable	  equivalent	  is	  this:	  Imagine	  hearing	  that	  a	  United	  States	  public	  good,	  say	  a	  mass-­‐transit	  system,	  had	  a	  percentage	  of	  its	  funding	  allocated	  to	  renovating	  train	  cars	  that	  were	  created	  last	  year.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  general	  public	  of	  the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  up	  in	  arms	  over	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  hard	  earned	  tax	  dollars	  are	  being	  wasted.	  While	  the	  explicitness	  of	  the	  reactions	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Chinese	  citizens	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would	  diverge	  due	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  Constitutional	  republic	  versus	  a	  Socialist	  state,	  the	  stigma	  of	  repudiation	  would	  be	  commensurate.	  A	  great	  way	  to	  ween	  off	  of	  CCP	  subsidies	  for	  wind	  power	  projects	  would	  be	  to	  institute	  sunset	  legislation.73	  A	  sunset	  provision	  is	  a	  measure	  within	  a	  law	  or	  regulation	  which	  mandates	  that	  the	  law,	  or	  subsidy	  in	  this	  case,	  will	  stop	  taking	  effect	  after	  a	  specific	  date	  in	  time.	  With	  market	  research	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  wind	  farm	  age	  and	  prices	  of	  energy,	  such	  a	  system,	  if	  instituted,	  could	  save	  government	  funds	  which	  can,	  in	  turn,	  be	  used	  in	  the	  development	  of	  additional	  renewable	  resources.	  In	  support	  of	  the	  above	  argument,	  in	  late	  February	  of	  2016,	  China’s	  NDRC	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  cut	  the	  onshore	  wind	  FIT	  by	  $0.02	  for	  type	  1	  (Inner	  Mongolia	  Province),	  type	  2	  (Hebei	  Province),	  and	  type	  3	  (Jilin	  Province)	  wind	  regions.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  cut	  since	  China’s	  subsidy	  surcharge	  issue	  has	  gotten	  out	  of	  hand,	  and	  is	  thankfully	  milder	  than	  many	  had	  projected.	  The	  NDRC’s	  mandate	  states	  that	  two	  groups	  will	  pay	  for	  the	  FIT	  going	  forward:	  The	  portion	  of	  the	  price	  of	  wind	  that	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  regional	  coal	  power	  plant	  price	  will	  be	  funded	  by	  the	  local	  provincial	  grid	  operators.	  The	  remainder,	  which	  is	  roughly	  40%	  or	  less	  of	  the	  price,	  will	  be	  backed	  by	  the	  CCP’s	  renewable	  energy	  development	  fund.74	  	  The	  takeaway	  here	  is	  that	  wind	  power	  in	  China	  is	  now	  undeniably	  cost	  competitive	  with	  fossil	  fuels.	  Therefore,	  as	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  polluter,	  China	  now	  has	  no	  excuse	  to	  continue	  generating	  over	  60%	  of	  its	  energy	  from	  coal-­‐fired	  power.	  In	  China’s	  13th	  five-­‐
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year-­‐plan,	  they	  acknowledged	  just	  that,	  by	  aiming	  for	  an	  ambitious	  15%	  non-­‐fossil	  fuel	  primary	  energy	  target	  by	  2020.75	  Fundamentally,	  China	  provides	  the	  lowest	  cost	  for	  onshore	  wind	  with	  installed	  costs	  of	  $1300	  per	  KwH,	  as	  compared	  to	  $1900	  per	  KwH	  in	  the	  US.	  China’s	  operations	  and	  maintenance	  costs	  annually	  are	  between	  $35	  and	  $46	  per	  KwH,	  while	  coal’s	  O&M	  cost	  range	  from	  $27	  to	  $53.76	  Additionally,	  as	  modeled	  above,	  China’s	  FIT	  has	  brought	  the	  LCOE	  of	  wind	  down	  to	  competitive	  pricing	  with	  coal,	  in	  some	  cases	  boasting	  cheaper	  prices.	  By	  enacting	  laws	  to	  lower	  the	  FIT	  for	  three	  regions,	  China	  has	  provided	  support	  for	  my	  proposal	  that	  by	  allowing	  the	  free	  market	  to	  take	  its	  course,	  as	  Milton	  Friedman	  said,	  “	  coordinates	  the	  activity	  of	  millions	  of	  people,	  each	  seeking	  his	  own	  interest,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  make	  everyone	  better	  off.”77	  Nevertheless,	  one	  must	  remember	  that	  China	  still	  must	  address	  major	  structural	  issues	  before	  reaping	  the	  benefits	  of	  such	  wind	  power	  construction	  growth.	  Despite	  cost	  successes,	  China	  still	  must	  allow	  better	  conditions	  for	  access	  to	  the	  grid,	  mandate	  comprehensive	  and	  fair	  transmission	  rules,	  and	  build	  efficient	  and	  reliable	  UHV	  transmission	  lines.	  Unfortunately,	  data	  for	  China’s	  Smart	  Grid	  infrastructural	  development	  has	  not	  been	  publicly	  disclosed.	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  measure	  the	  time	  frame	  that	  China	  must	  have	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  develop	  and	  adapt	  to	  its	  new	  grid	  and	  renewable	  resources.	  However,	  CCP-­‐run	  agencies,	  such	  as	  the	  People’s	  Daily	  News	  source	  as	  well	  as	  the	  NDRC,	  have	  announced	  that	  it	  plans	  to	  spend	  at	  least	  $320	  billion	  between	  2016	  and	  2020	  in	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order	  to	  rebuild	  its	  grid	  infrastructure.78	  China	  has	  already	  spent	  roughly	  $150	  billion	  on	  Smart	  Grid	  infrastructure	  and	  transmission	  line	  construction.	  It’s	  clear	  that	  the	  funding	  for	  China’s	  energy	  reconstruction	  is	  sizable	  and	  further	  that,	  with	  China’s	  current	  economic	  slowdown	  in	  2015	  and	  2016,	  there	  is	  no	  margin	  for	  production	  errors.	  While	  China	  has	  announced	  ambitious	  targets	  for	  15%	  renewable	  energy	  output	  by	  2020	  and	  the	  entire	  grid	  infrastructure	  to	  be	  completed	  by	  2025,	  the	  evidence	  presented	  regarding	  internal	  systemic	  bottlenecks	  suggests	  China	  will	  not	  have	  a	  completed	  energy	  grid	  and	  wind	  program	  with	  full	  operational	  capacity	  until	  at	  earliest	  2030.	  China	  is	  facing	  issues	  in	  transmission	  development,	  grid	  development,	  uncontrollable	  energy	  consumption	  levels,	  and	  an	  international	  reputation	  that	  is	  in	  serious	  trouble.	  To	  worsen	  the	  situation,	  China’s	  strong	  consistent	  economic	  growth	  rates	  have	  dwindled	  from	  between	  8%	  and	  12%	  from	  2008	  through	  2013,	  to	  6.8%	  in	  2014	  and	  2015.	  Because	  the	  slowdown	  has	  been	  largely	  caused	  by	  both	  an	  import-­‐export	  imbalance	  and	  structural	  uncertainty	  of	  China,	  the	  energy	  grid	  infrastructure	  will	  likely	  see	  its	  own	  curtailment	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2016.	  China	  will	  need	  to	  sacrifice	  some	  economic	  growth	  regardless	  in	  favor	  of	  bettering	  the	  Chinese	  people’s	  quality	  of	  life.	  I	  predict	  that	  analysts	  willing	  to	  perform	  data	  analysis	  on	  China’s	  Smart	  Grid	  infrastructure	  funding	  would	  get	  a	  reading	  of	  China’s	  inherent	  characteristic	  bottlenecks,	  driven	  by	  their	  inability	  to	  adapt	  efficiently.	  	  Perhaps	  China’s	  largest	  enemy	  as	  of	  right	  now	  is	  time;	  the	  Chinese	  government	  and	  population	  cannot	  afford	  to	  wait	  until	  2030	  for	  their	  air	  pollution	  to	  begin	  to	  subside,	  because	  there	  are	  serious	  health,	  environmental	  and	  social	  costs	  for	  China	  which	  worsen	  year	  over	  year.	  A	  Bloomberg	  News	  study	  estimated	  China’s	  air	  pollution	  to	  cost	  China	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economically	  about	  7%	  of	  their	  GDP,	  when	  taking	  into	  account	  both	  short	  term	  and	  long	  term	  health	  scenarios.79	  MIT	  research	  studies	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  polluted	  air	  significantly	  raises	  morbidity	  and	  mortality	  rates.	  They	  proved	  that	  such	  rates	  cause	  increased	  medical	  expenses	  and	  greater	  number	  of	  missed	  work	  days,	  leading	  to	  decreased	  productivity.80	  China’s	  polluted	  air	  also	  has	  indirectly	  affected	  China’s	  economy	  in	  the	  attraction	  of	  foreign	  investment	  for	  the	  new	  Shanghai	  Free	  Trade	  Zone	  as	  of	  2013.	  Many	  businesses	  would	  rather	  not	  operate	  in	  an	  unclean	  environment,	  especially	  considering	  that	  such	  an	  environment	  deters	  tourism.	  In	  2013,	  foreign	  tourism	  was	  down	  5%	  across	  China,	  as	  well	  as	  10.5%	  down	  specifically	  for	  Beijing.	  It	  is	  difficult	  for	  foreigners	  to	  avoid	  seeing	  or	  hearing	  about	  China’s	  smoggy	  air,	  as	  media	  outlets	  worldwide	  love	  to	  use	  it	  as	  a	  poster	  child	  for	  the	  consequences	  that	  fossil	  fuels	  have	  brought	  to	  the	  anthropocene.	  	  Two	  further	  effects	  of	  air	  pollution	  are	  its	  depletion	  of	  natural	  resources	  and	  buildings.	  Air	  pollution	  causes	  acid	  rain,	  which	  in	  turn	  translates	  to	  soil	  acidification,	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  area	  of	  China’s	  arable	  land,	  and	  hence	  lessened	  productivity.	  Further,	  each	  year	  that	  coal-­‐fired	  power	  plants	  remain	  as	  China’s	  largest	  power	  source,	  mercury	  is	  emitted	  by	  coal	  combustion	  into	  Chinese	  water	  systems.	  This	  polluted	  water	  toxifies	  the	  water,	  and	  in	  turn	  mutates	  or	  kills	  fish,	  rice,	  vegetables,	  and	  fruits.	  It	  also	  emits	  pollutants	  in	  the	  air	  which	  are	  deleterious	  to	  trees	  and	  forests.	  China’s	  battle	  with	  air	  pollution	  has	  become	  so	  severe	  that	  it	  has	  caused	  building	  structures	  to	  deteriorate,	  including	  sacred	  historical	  monuments	  such	  as	  the	  temples	  of	  Hangzhou.	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While	  China’s	  rise	  to	  the	  world’s	  second	  largest	  economy	  has	  been	  almost	  entirely	  caused	  by	  low-­‐price	  competitive	  export	  based	  manufacturing	  industries,	  their	  recent	  	  economic	  deceleration	  has	  been	  bad	  news	  for	  the	  industrial	  sector.	  Thousands	  of	  industry	  factories	  have	  been	  driven	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  red,	  and	  the	  even	  greater	  issue	  is	  that	  most	  of	  these	  factories	  are	  state	  owned.	  Therefore,	  China’s	  competitive	  advantage	  in	  manufacturing	  has	  been	  diminished,	  and	  now	  China	  must	  begin	  to	  transition	  from	  an	  export	  based	  economy	  into	  an	  internal	  consumption	  based	  economy.	  However,	  while	  China’s	  population	  certainly	  is	  not	  lacking,	  reports	  by	  Business	  Insider	  indicate	  that	  China’s	  move	  from	  coal-­‐fired	  power	  to	  renewable	  energy	  will	  cause	  significant	  job	  losses	  for	  the	  Chinese	  population.	  	  The	  CCP	  has	  announced	  that	  it	  plans	  to	  lay	  off	  1.8	  million	  workers	  in	  the	  coal	  industry.81	  Such	  job	  losses	  are	  indicative	  of	  a	  future	  issues	  though.	  China’s	  transition	  out	  of	  coal	  will	  lead	  to	  further	  job	  losses	  in	  the	  coal	  industry,	  which	  employs	  roughly	  12	  million	  people.	  While	  on	  one	  hand	  a	  transition	  into	  renewables	  means	  that	  renewable	  jobs	  will	  be	  cultivated,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  there	  will	  be	  an	  uneducated	  12	  million	  blue-­‐collar	  workers	  out	  of	  jobs.	  Ultimately,	  these	  layoffs	  need	  to	  happen	  at	  one	  point	  or	  another,	  and	  it	  is	  better	  that	  China	  tackles	  them	  now	  as	  opposed	  to	  during	  a	  domino	  effect	  leading	  to	  economic	  collapse.	  By	  acting	  on	  this	  now,	  China	  is	  going	  against	  the	  characteristic	  I	  used	  to	  describe	  them	  and	  actually	  constructing	  from	  the	  ground	  up!	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  actually	  many	  labor	  opportunities	  that	  will	  become	  available	  for	  work	  on	  the	  various	  smart-­‐grid	  applications.	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Chapter	  7:	  Conclusion	  	   China’s	  transition	  from	  a	  developing	  country	  into	  the	  world’s	  second	  largest	  economy	  has	  been	  nothing	  short	  of	  mesmerizing.	  While	  China	  has	  reached	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  technology	  sector,	  industrial	  sector,	  and	  many	  others,	  its	  successes	  have	  not	  come	  without	  detrimental	  consequence.	  s.	  China’s	  opening	  to	  the	  world	  economy	  in	  1979	  announced	  to	  the	  world	  that	  China	  was	  eager	  to	  catch	  up,	  and	  that	  it	  could	  do	  so	  by	  developing	  manufacturing	  as	  the	  heart	  of	  China’s	  transition.	  By	  offering	  cheap	  labor,	  and	  hence	  cheap	  exports,	  China	  has	  since	  served	  as	  the	  world’s	  manufacturing	  hub.	  However,	  the	  Chinese	  ignored	  one	  crucial	  matter	  that	  has	  since	  come	  to	  hurt	  them	  as	  a	  nation:	  the	  coal-­‐fired	  power	  that	  powered	  over	  90%	  of	  China’s	  high	  energy	  supply	  during	  that	  time	  would	  release	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  in	  the	  area.	  Furthermore,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  coal	  plants	  that	  were	  located	  in	  the	  North	  would	  have	  those	  emissions	  blown	  across	  the	  nation	  by	  wind.	  	  	   The	  decades	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  that	  filled	  China’s	  area,	  coupled	  with	  rising	  environmental	  activism,	  have	  deemed	  China	  as	  the	  world’s	  largest	  polluter	  –	  a	  reputation	  which	  no	  nation	  wants.	  While	  China	  has	  since	  sought	  to	  repair	  its	  image	  by	  becoming	  the	  world’s	  leading	  nation	  in	  wind	  power,	  it	  has	  failed	  to	  disclose	  the	  truth	  behind	  its	  renewable	  successes.	  This	  paper	  has	  intended	  to	  point	  out	  that	  China	  has	  deceived	  the	  global	  energy	  sector	  by	  reporting	  their	  colossal	  installed	  capacity	  of	  wind	  turbines,	  while	  hiding	  the	  amount	  of	  wind	  turbines	  that	  genuinely	  produce	  electricity.	  By	  doing	  so,	  China	  has	  essentially	  worked	  backwards	  as	  they’ve	  constructed	  thousands	  of	  wind	  farms	  before	  providing	  them	  actual	  functionality	  by	  grid-­‐connection.	  Moreover,	  this	  characteristic	  of	  working	  backwards	  is	  not	  an	  isolated	  situation.	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   China	  has	  had	  major	  issues	  with	  grid	  integration	  and	  curtailment,	  and	  has	  sought	  to	  fix	  those	  issues	  by	  building	  a	  Smart	  Grid.	  China	  has	  focused	  their	  Smart	  Grid	  on	  featuring	  the	  strongest	  and	  most	  efficient	  UHV	  long-­‐distance	  transmission	  lines,	  but	  in	  doing	  so	  has	  left	  their	  lines	  with	  only	  20%	  efficiency.	  In	  this	  circumstance,	  China	  again	  worked	  backwards	  by	  attempting	  to	  develop	  strong	  transmission	  lines	  before	  developing	  and	  strengthening	  the	  regional	  grids	  that	  could	  support	  such	  lines.	  Likewise,	  in	  developing	  Smart	  AMR	  meters	  for	  every	  household	  across	  the	  mainland,	  China	  installed	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  meters	  before	  designing	  the	  back	  office	  software	  that	  could	  support	  such	  a	  system.	  The	  economic	  analysis	  portion	  of	  the	  paper	  has	  provided	  evidence	  that	  such	  errors	  cost	  China	  drastically	  financially,	  socially,	  environmentally,	  and	  politically.	  	   This	  thesis	  is	  important	  because	  it	  brings	  light	  to	  China’s	  systemic	  and	  characteristic	  issues	  which	  must	  be	  addressed	  before	  China	  continues	  to	  structure	  its	  energy	  system	  and	  wind	  program.	  Because	  this	  paper	  did	  not	  include	  data	  analytics,	  it	  would	  be	  useful	  for	  further	  study	  to	  be	  conducted	  on	  ratio	  between	  the	  actual	  generation	  percentage	  of	  China’s	  wind	  turbines	  to	  the	  installed	  capacity	  of	  such	  turbines.	  It	  would	  also	  be	  valuable	  for	  additional	  research	  to	  be	  conducted	  on	  true	  efficiency	  of	  China’s	  political	  system,	  and	  as	  I	  point	  out	  in	  this	  paper,	  what	  could	  be	  modified	  to	  increase	  efficiency	  so	  as	  to	  minimize	  costs.	  	  	  	  	  
